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Abstract 
Conducting an empirical study on cash flows of 71 private equity funds, spanning the vintages 
1990 to 2008, we compare the two most common performance measures, IRR and TVPI, to 
four proposed alternatives. We also document cash flow characteristics that complicate 
performance measurement. Our findings determine that funds rank differently depending on 
the measure we employ. However, rank correlations among all measures suggest that the 
differences are fairly small, and that deviations further decrease when excluding young funds. 
Funds identified as top quartile by one measure are likely to receive similar appraisals by 
other measures, but performance is neither robustly, nor fully described by only one measure. 
The alternative measures better align the interests between the general and limited partners, 
and contribute to separate skill from fortunate timing. Limited partners should therefore use 
several measures in the appraisal of fund performance.    
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1. Introduction 
Historical performance is one of the most important selection criteria of private equity (PE)
 1
  
funds. Limited partners (LPs) rely on measures that attempt to describe the true performance 
of funds and their general partners (GPs). The measures should therefore express performance 
in a consistent manner, and allow for comparison across funds. Their correct use and 
interpretation is essential. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to provide the LPs of PE funds with the resources to 
analyze the financial performance of funds. More specifically, we ask: Does the choice of 
performance measure shape the appraisal of private equity funds? The question is investigated 
using cash flow data at the fund level, provided by LPs operating in the Nordic region. 
Industry standards in reporting of PE fund performance concentrate on the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) and multiples of Paid-in capital. Several authors argue that the IRR 
misrepresents true return in a PE context, and that the multiples may fool potential investors 
as they do not consider the timing of cash flows. Alternative measures of performance that 
have been put forward include the Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR), Profitability 
Index (PI), Index Comparison Method (ICM) and Public Market equivalent (PME). 
We elaborate on the arguments of using the standard measures, their associated pitfalls, and 
investigate whether the four mentioned alternatives would alter the appraisal of fund 
performance. None of the investigated measures performs any specific risk adjustment for the 
fund. Differences in the appraisal of funds across the performance measures are investigated 
through rankings of the funds. 
Our findings determine that funds rank differently depending on the measure we employ, and 
that the alternative performance measures can offer additional insight about a fund’s true 
performance. However, rank correlations among all measures suggest that the differences are 
fairly small, and further decrease when young funds are excluded. 
The economic interpretation derived from these results is that a fund that has performed well 
according to one measure is likely to receive a similar appraisal from another measure. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that fund performance will receive a robust description from 
only one measure. Other measures can contribute to show differences in skill and determine 
true top performers.  
                                                 
1
 A summary of definitions can be found in the appendices. 
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While Wang and Conner (2004) show that there is a high probability of being among top 
quartile funds in at least one year during their life using standard measures, we show that 
choosing from additional measures will greatly increase this probability. TVPI and IRR only 
differ in selecting two funds as top quartile, but over 40 percent of the funds in our sample are 
identified as top quartile by at least one measure. From this, we establish that past 
performance should be investigated using several measures, and confirm a weak efficiency of 
generic selection rules such as choosing funds of GPs whose previous funds rank as top 
quartile funds by only one measure. Finally, performance measures with NPV properties will 
provide GPs with incentives that are more aligned with the LPs interests.    
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, existing literature is 
presented. Section 3 presents the performance measures and difficulties in measuring 
performance of PE funds. Section 4 to 7 comprise an empirical study where we utilize six 
performance measures and variations of these to describe PE fund performance, and how they 
differ in doing so. The dataset is presented in Section 4, while characteristics of PE that 
complicate performance measurement are presented in Section 5. We compare the 
performance measures through rankings and correlations in Section 6. In section 7 we analyze 
the severity of pitfalls related to the standard measures, and how the alternative performance 
measures improve on these pitfalls. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
There is a large and growing volume of literature studying the economics of PE. Most studies 
has centered on the aggregate trends of PE or the relationship between GPs and portfolio 
companies. The relationship between GPs and LPs has, until recently, largely been neglected. 
A limited availability of data may in part explain this fact, but since the turn of the century 
more studies have been devoted to the study of these relationships. Increased availability of 
data and interest from investors has spawned research into the performance of funds, their 
relative performance compared to public markets and the attractiveness of investing in PE 
funds. However, few studies investigate how performance measures differ in describing 
performance of PE funds. 
Among works that are most closely related to this thesis is an article written by Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2007), which adds to the literature of performance evaluation. Here, the authors 
show how the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) overstates PE fund performance and 
misrepresents the relative ranking of funds. They also report that using a Modified Internal 
Rate of Return (MIRR) results in a more accurate true return for investors. Phalippou (2008) 
further elaborates on the failures of IRR, the distorted incentives it creates in a PE context, 
and how it creates upward biased performance averages and volatility estimates. Also, he 
shows how MIRR can be implemented to tackle these problems. Kreuter and Gottschalg 
(2006) discuss similar problems and show that the efficiency of simple selection rules, such as 
choosing the top quartile funds, is limited compared to more comprehensive rating 
procedures.  
Performance measurement of financial investments as a field of study was spurred by Sharpe 
(1966) and is covered by a vast literature, although the number of studies is significantly 
reduced when looking at performance measurement in PE. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and 
Welch (2004) investigate how performance measures can be manipulated, and form part of 
the inspiration for this thesis. The structure and objective of this thesis also resemble that of 
Eling and Schuhmacher (2006). Although the asset class under investigation is hedge funds 
and measures are different, it is linked to our study because they investigate whether the 
choice of performance measure influence the ranking of funds. They conclude that the choice 
among common performance measures hardly affects the relative performance of hedge 
funds. It relates to Pedersen and Rudholm-Alfvin (2003) who perform a similar study.  
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This thesis does not perform risk adjustments, but still share similarities with studies that do. 
Ick (2005) investigate risk - return relationships of PE relative to public markets, but also 
comment on the characteristics of IRR, the PME and excess return measures. Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003) analyze cash flows, risk and return of PE funds, for a data sample similar 
to ours. Gompers and Lerner (1997) carried out a study using data similar to Ljungqvist and 
Richardson, albeit just for one fund. Among other studies looking at risk-return relationships 
are Cochrane (2001), Hwang, Quigley and Woodward (2005) and Gottschalg and Phalippou 
(2005), who provide mixed results regarding risk adjusted performance. The latest suggest 
that PE funds substantially underperform on a risk adjusted basis net of fees with respect to 
the S&P 500.  
The objective of this thesis is not decomposing the determinants of performance, but to study 
the relationship between the performance measures. Still, we present extensive descriptive 
statistics showing performance broken down by several fund characteristics. Korstvedt (2007) 
is one of few studies utilizing a similar dataset, but here the main issue is factors determining 
performance. Other studies of performance determinants are Kaplan and Schoar (2003), 
Gompers et al. (2006), Sorensen (2007) and Zarutskie (2007).  Kaplan and Schoar calculate 
IRR, PME and Total Value to Paid-in capital (TVPI) for PE funds, and find strong persistence 
in fund returns.  
Cumming and Waltz (2004) analyze PE return and disclosure. They show that systematic 
biases exist in the reporting of fund performance. Reported Net Asset Values (NAV) may 
never materialize into actual returns and may also be subject to manipulation. Blaydon and 
Horvath (2002) investigate valuation differences and document that an investor can receive 
two different valuations when investing in a company via two funds. These factors will be a 
potential source of bias in our data due to a high percentage of active funds.  
While studies like Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2008), Gompers (1996), and Kandel, 
Leshchinskii and Yuklea (2006), look at the incentives provided by the organizational 
structure of PE funds, we comment on incentives provided by the performance measures. In a 
recent study, Phalippou (2009) discusses how both contracts and performance measures may 
cause misaligned interests between GPs and LPs.  
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3. Performance Measurement in Private Equity 
When evaluating performance of PE Funds, we need reliable measures that are able to express 
performance and facilitate comparison across funds. A LP makes investments decisions, 
among other criteria, based on financial performance measures of the different funds. 
3.1 Difficulties in Measuring Performance 
When an investor wants to measure relative performance among stock index funds or mutual 
funds, he or she will usually turn to performance measures such as Sharp’s measure, 
Treynor’s measure, Jensen’s measure or the Information Ratio, depending on the investor’s 
portfolio and investment universe (see Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2008). In order to calculate 
these measures one needs the standard deviation of returns or the systematic risk for the fund 
portfolio. With daily market values for the portfolio companies it is possible to make an 
inference about these parameters with a high degree of confidence. PE funds invest in unlisted 
companies or in listed companies they subsequently delist. The daily market values for the 
portfolio companies are therefore unobservable. Reported accounting values for the portfolio 
companies are changed infrequently, and will cause biased estimates of volatility or 
systematic risk of a PE fund. 
This thesis compares measures that do not perform fund-specific risk adjustments. Current 
literature offers methods for estimating the risk of PE investments. Bilo, Christophers, 
Degosciu, and Zimmermann (2005) develop the LPX index based on publicly traded 
companies, whose business relates to PE. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) estimate a fund’s 
beta by matching the individual investments in a fund to listed companies. Jones and Rhodes-
Kopf (2003) use cash flow data to estimate the risk of PE funds, treating reported values of 
non-exited companies as unbiased estimates of market values. Driessen, Phalippou and Lin 
(2009) test if risk is time-varying, and compare the risk profile of different types of PE funds 
by using a new General Method of Moments methodology. They find a high beta, especially 
for venture capital funds. 
There are certain features of PE investments that further complicate performance 
measurement of PE funds. The usual long time-span between the investments and realizations 
leaves the investor unable to observe performance for long periods. Time is also required for a 
fund to be fully invested. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) find that it takes six years for 90 
percent of committed capital to be invested, and that it takes eight years for the IRR of the 
average fund to turn positive. This is part of the typical pattern of PE fund returns, known as 
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the J-curve pattern (Burgel 2000). At inception, and shortly after, a fund usually displays zero 
or negative IRRs. This is because start-up costs and management fees are paid out of the first 
contributions, and also because of conservative accounting rules. Revaluations of portfolio 
investments do not occur until major value increases has been witnessed. The information 
contained in early performance figures is of little value and he states that “individual funds 
should be assessed over periods that cover at least four years” (Burgel 2000:37). 
Grabenwarter and Weiding (2005) also recommend leaving out funds younger than four years 
when doing empirical studies of PE funds.  
The long period before funds are fully invested will also create a gap between fund returns 
and LP returns. In order to make contributions when requested by the GP, the LP has to hold a 
share of the committed capital in highly liquid assets which are easily converted into cash. 
The expected returns on these assets are lower than that of PE. When evaluating funds this 
liquidity cost should be considered. However, most LPs invest in several funds over a year 
and separating their liquid assets into individual funds become difficult. Liquidity costs will 
further depend on the LPs ability to time contributions with distributions. 
In addition, comparing funds across time may produce wrong conclusions about performance. 
General market conditions and competition among PE funds will affect a fund’s ability to 
make profitable investments in portfolio companies (see Gompers and Lerner 2004).  These 
factors can change significantly from one year to another and performance should therefore 
not be evaluated without adjustments for vintage. 
The long period with unobservable performance and the difficulties related to risk-
adjustments of returns induce many investors to use more simple methods when measuring 
performance of PE funds. Though the methodology in which the performance of a fund 
should be measured is not clear, a push for more uniform reporting standards is driven by 
associations such as the European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA). 
The EVCA issued its first Reporting Guidelines in 2000 (EVCA 2009). They have been 
widely adopted across the PE industry, as is also true for the valuation guidelines (Mathonet 
and Monjanel 2006). In order for a fund to claim compliance with the Guidelines some 
requirements must be applied and some recommendations may be adopted at the discretion of 
the fund manager (EVCA 2006). The introduction of uniform reporting standards makes 
comparison among funds easier, but access to reports is still limited, as it is governed by strict 
policies of non-disclosure to other than LPs. 
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3.2 Standard Performance Measures 
The EVCA regards IRR and the multiples Distributed to Paid-in capital (DPI), Residual Value 
to Paid-in capital (RVPI) and Total Value to Paid-in capital (TVPI) as “the most appropriate 
performance indicators” (EVCA 2006: 25). The presentation of these performance measures, 
net of fees and carried interest, are required for funds older than two years in order to claim 
compliance with the EVCA Reporting Guidelines. However, both IRR and the multiples have 
several pitfalls that may threaten the ability of the LP to make correct comparisons of fund 
performance. 
3.2.1 IRR 
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is a widely used capital budgeting technique for evaluating 
investment projects by chief financial officers (Brealey, Myers, Allen 2006). It relates to Net 
Present Value (NPV) in the sense that it may be defined as “the discount rate which makes the 
NPV equal to zero” (Brealey et al. 2006: 91). If this discount rate is higher than the 
opportunity cost, the investment under consideration should be accepted. The IRR is 
calculated using the following equation: 
𝐼𝑅𝑅 =   
𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1+𝐼𝑅𝑅)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0 = 0 ,      (1) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑡  is the cash flow, distribution minus contribution, at time 𝑡 from inception, and 𝑇 is 
the date of the final cash flow. Equation 1 shows that IRR depends on both the timing and the 
amounts of the cash flows. IRRs calculated at a point of time previous to liquidation, called 
interim IRRs, include the residual value of the funds as a final cash flow (Burgel 2000). 
Interim and final IRRs will converge as the fund matures and the residual value diminishes. 
Returns are driven by several factors in the IRR formula. All else being equal, it will increase 
as higher capital gains are realized through divestments, requested draw-downs are smaller 
and the shorter the periods between contributions and distributions are (Burgel 2000). These 
are attractive features of a performance measure. IRR shows how time-efficient a fund has 
invested and returned money and, being a rate of return; IRR is also easy to interpret and 
allows for comparison among alternatives. For the PE investor who wants to evaluate fund 
performance across sizes, IRR therefore seems like a reasonable option. 
However, there are several pitfalls when using IRR as a performance measure. First, the 
iterative procedure that is used to find the IRR may return zero or several solutions. Second, 
the IRR may misinterpret the investor’s cash flows and return a positive IRR even though 
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more capital is invested than returned. This is known as the “Lending versus Borrowing 
Problem” (Brealey et al. 2006: 93), and can happen if a fund makes a large distribution in its 
early years, while continuing to draw down capital which later is written off. Third, IRR 
assumes that all distributions are reinvested at the IRR rate. If the assumption holds, then IRR 
equals the effective rate of return. However, if the assumption does not hold, then IRR will 
exaggerate performance positively for funds with high IRRs and negatively for funds with 
low IRRs. As a consequence, the performance of funds will appear more dispersed than they 
truly are (Phalippou 2008). Fourth, IRR, which is a time-weighted, amount-weighted rate of 
return, cannot be compared to the time-weighted rate of return we observe from public market 
indices, because the influence on average overall return increases along with increased 
investments (see Bodie et. al. 2008: 852). 
According to Phalippou (2008), the most important issue with IRR as a performance measure 
is the incentives it provides the GPs with. IRR may not rank projects correctly according to 
other methods preferred in Corporate Finance text books such as the NPV, often due to 
differences in projects’ scales and durations. A typical buyout fund invests in about 15 
companies, while a typical venture fund invests in about 30 companies (Ljunggvist and 
Richardson 2003). Measuring these investments by IRR will create incentives for the PE fund 
to make short term investments which yield high IRRs but perhaps a lower NPV than longer 
lived alternatives. 
Also, the more weight put on IRR as a performance measure, the stronger the incentives are 
for the GPs to strategically time their cash flows in order to achieve high IRRs. We know that 
a shorter period between contributions and distributions increases IRR. In order to lock in a 
high IRR, GPs can pay out early distributions, even though doing so may reduce the total 
NPV of the fund. A typical scenario would be an investment that created a high IRR in the 
first couple of years, with the prospects of making more normalized returns in the next three. 
Although the expected normalized returns are above a given cost of capital, it can be rational 
for the fund manager to exit the investment after year two because keeping the investment 
will reduce the IRR towards more average returns. To make a quick exit, the PE fund may 
have to sell the investment at a discount, i.e. a price below the present value of the company, 
to attract potential buyers. The practice of underpricing has been documented by Lee and 
Wahal (2002) who show that venture capital backed IPOs are more underpriced, and Nahata 
and Masulius (2009) who show that when a venture capital fund is the seller of a firm in a 
M&A transaction the firm will be more underpriced. 
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The observed underpricing may also be a result of another weakness with IRR. As the interim 
IRR increases, the final IRR becomes less sensitive to late distributions. This is just the result 
of discounting the additional values at an often exaggerated cost of capital for many years. 
The incentives to make large distributions in order to increase the IRR will therefore weaken 
during a successful fund’s life. GPs of a mature fund with a high interim IRR may then prefer 
other payoffs, such as publicity through an IPO with large first-day returns achieved through 
underpricing, rather than increasing their IRR marginally by selling at a higher valuation.  
Although the carried interest works as an instrument to align the interests of the GPs and the 
LPs and reduce the distorted incentives, Phalippou (2009) illustrates how standard contracts 
between GPs and LPs may also cause the same conflict of interests.  
3.2.2 Multiples 
Along with IRR net of fees and carried interest, PE funds are obligated to report the multiples 
DPI, RVPI and TVPI, all net off fees and carried interest, in order to claim compliance with 
the EVCA Reporting Guidelines. The multiples are absolute measures and illustrate the 
following (EVCA 2006): 
DPI – Distribution to Paid-in capital – measures all distributions made to LPs relative to all 
paid-in capital, and displays actual returned cash to investors. Unrealized investments do not 
affect this multiple.  
RVPI – Residual Value to Paid-in capital – measures the unrealized value of fund investments 
that the LP is entitled to as a proportion of all Paid-in capital.  
TVPI – Total Value to Paid-in capital – is the sum of DPI and RVPI, and is often referred to 
as the “Multiple”.  
The simple nature of the multiples makes them easy to interpret, which explains much of their 
popularity. It is also why multiples cannot be used without caution. Comparing funds by 
multiples will in many ways be like comparing apples with oranges, unless the investor 
accounts for fund duration and vintage. A more severe pitfall is that the multiples do not 
account for the time-value of money. Two funds with identical multiples and age will 
therefore be ranked identically, independent of the timing of contributions and distributions.   
By ignoring the time-value of money, the simple multiples can either understate or overstate 
the performance of a PE fund, depending on the timing of the cash flows and assumptions 
about the cost of capital. For example, an investment that yields a multiple of two in five 
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years, with no interim cash flows and a cost of capital of 15 percent, has a negative NPV. The 
mentioned cost of capital is equal to the one that Metric (2007: 79) 
 
assumes for venture 
capital.  
When IRR and multiples are evaluated together, some of the individual measures’ pitfalls are 
rectified. The multiple can be used to analyze the effects of the reinvestment assumption 
underlying IRR. For a mature fund with a high IRR, an average TVPI indicates that the 
reinvestment assumption overstates the fund’s true performance. Also, total return multiples 
will act as a counterweight to the distorted incentives provided by IRR, as they provide 
incentives to keep investments that will increase nominal returns, even if the risk-adjusted 
returns are negative. IRR, on the other hand, can be used to rank funds with equal multiples to 
adjust for the time-value of money. 
3.3 Alternative Performance Measures 
It seems odd that, given the pitfalls related to IRR and the multiples required by EVCA’s 
Reporting Guidelines, alternative performance measures have not been more widely adopted 
in PE practice. Though corporate finance textbooks such as Brealey et al. (2006)
 
recommend 
using NPV over IRR as a capital budgeting technique, many managers prefer IRR since the 
method simplifies comparison between alternatives, as it is a rate of return (Pike and Neal 
1996). This argument is also one of the explanations put forward by Phalippou (2008) when 
describing why NPV remains out of use by PE practitioners, the second being that 
practitioners do not want to assume a cost of capital. Finding the cost of capital for PE funds 
with existing cost of capital models would probably be time-consuming and very sensitive to 
the assumptions used. This, combined with NPV being dependent upon scale, may cause NPV 
to be inappropriate or at least unpractical in a PE setting. 
To overcome the obstacles with NPV as a performance measure of PE funds, modifications 
and alternative measures have been proposed in the literature. They all have a cost of capital 
component, but the rates are built on different assumptions. Their cost of capital are unlikely 
to reflect a fund’s true cost of capital, but act as substitutes of the alternative costs of forgoing 
public market investments or as assumptions of the cost of capital for the asset class. None of 
the performance measures are meant to be used in an optimal portfolio allocation problem. 
However, the alternative measures are useful to the LP who wishes to improve on some of the 
standard performance measures’ pitfalls.  
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3.3.1 MIRR 
Phalippou (2008) recommends the use of the Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR) in 
appraisal of PE fund performance. MIRR is the least popular of seven investigated capital 
budgeting techniques in the US according to Ryan and Ryan (2000). Pike and Neal (1996: 
144) define the MIRR as “that rate of return which, when the initial outlay is compared with 
the terminal value of the project’s net cash flows reinvested at the cost of capital, gives an 
NPV of zero”. It is a method that seeks to adjust the IRR so that it has the same reinvestment 
assumption as the NPV approach. MIRR is defined as 
𝑀𝐼𝑅𝑅 = (
𝐹𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟 .
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 .
)
1
𝑇 −  1      (2)    
where, 
𝐹𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟 . =   𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟.  1 + 𝑖𝑡 
𝑇−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0      (3)   
and  
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 . =   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟.  1 + 𝑖𝑡 
−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0      (4) 
The numerator in equation 2 expresses the terminal value of the distributions at time 𝑇, and 
the denominator the present value of contributions (at 𝑡 = 0). We see from equation 3 and 4 
that MIRR allows us to use a discount rate (reinvestment rate) of distributions that differs 
from the discount rate (finance rate) of contributions. In order to compare performance 
between funds, one can use a quasi consensus hurdle rate for PE funds or a public market 
index as the reinvestment and finance rates, as Phalippou (2008) suggests. He interprets 
common industry practice of charging carried interest with a hurdle rate of eight percent, to be 
a quasi consensus hurdle rate in PE.
 
 
One effect of setting an identical reinvestment rate for all funds is that the exaggerated 
dispersion in funds’ performance caused by IRR will be reduced. Further, MIRR improves on 
several of IRR’s pitfalls. The most obvious improvement is that MIRR gives the investor an 
opportunity to infer something about the reinvestment rate, and to test how sensitive a PE 
fund’s performance is to lower reinvestment rate assumptions. 
 Also, IRR discounts the cash flows using one discount rate for both contributions and 
distributions, assuming contributions and distributions share the same systematic risk. It 
seems reasonable, when discussing PE investments, to question this assumption. Both LPs 
and GPs are restricted by contracts which specify the amount committed to a fund and the 
period for investing. With the timing of the contributions within the investment period as the 
18 
 
only uncertain element, the systematic risk of contributions could be considered reduced 
towards zero. The distributions are expected to vary depending on general market conditions 
and therefore have a stronger element of systematic risk. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) 
propose to account for the difference in risk by discounting contributions at a different and 
lower rate than for distributions. The use of MIRR thus enables the investor to adjust for 
differences in systematic risk between contributions and distributions. Further, MIRR is 
uniquely and always defined, removing the problem related to IRR sometimes returning zero 
or several solutions. 
More important, MIRR better aligns the incentives and interests between the LPs and GPs 
(see Phalippou, 2008). While IRR may decrease by delaying the exit of an investment that 
earns above the cost of capital, the NPV properties of MIRR will cause MIRR to increase as 
long as the investment yields returns above the cost of capital. Hence, MIRR will be 
maximized when investments are held until the marginal return equals the marginal cost of 
capital. 
3.3.2 Profitability Index 
An investor interested in evaluating funds of different sizes by NPV can also use the 
Profitability Index (PI). The PI is defined as the value created in terms of NPV per unit 
invested (Brealey et al. 2006) and can be written as: 
𝑃𝐼 =  
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐹
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 .
           (5) 
where,  
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐹 =   𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟.  1 + 𝑖𝑡 
−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0  −   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟.  1 + 𝑖𝑡 
−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0       (6) 
and 
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 . =   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟.  1 + 𝑖𝑡 
−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0        (7) 
A PI above (below) zero indicates value creation (destruction). The scale dependency in NPV 
is thereby tackled without great difficulties. Further, PI improves on IRR in many ways like 
MIRR; the exaggerated performance caused by the reinvestment assumption in IRR will be 
reduced and we see from equation 4 and 5 that it allows us to use separate discount rates for 
contributions and distributions. Being an NPV-based measure it would punish foregoing 
opportunities to increase NPV, providing incentives that perhaps are more aligned between 
LPs and GPs. 
19 
 
In order to calculate a fund’s true PI one has to find the fund’s true cost of capital. We have 
briefly discussed the difficulties surrounding this task for PE investments. A simplification is 
offered by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003). They benchmark the PE cash flows to a public 
index, using the annualized return from a fund’s inception to its last reporting date. The 
holding period of the index investment thus matches the lifespan of the fund. The annualized 
rate of return from an index can be regarded as the opportunity cost of not investing in a 
public market during the life of the fund. Only using two data points as inputs for calculating 
the benchmark hurdle rate, causes a mismatch with the timing of cash flows, as contributions 
and distributions are made over time. The measure also becomes sensitive to short term public 
market fluctuations using this calculation, and might be subject to strategic timing by GPs, 
who are in a position to determine the point of the final cash flow. 
3.3.3 The Index Comparison Method 
The Index Comparison Method (ICM) was developed by Long and Nickels (1996). They 
wanted to measure the relative performance of a private market investment to that of a public 
index, put in other words; what would the performance on a total return basis have been, had 
they invested the net cash flows of the PE investments in a public index? In order to do so, the 
performance measure needed to account for the timing and amounts of the cash flows. 
The ICM calculates the opportunity cost of capital for the PE funds by investing 
(withdrawing) the same cash flows into a public market index as those invested (distributed) 
by the fund. The object is to find the terminal value (TV) of the index investments, which 
equals the future value of all contributions minus the future value of all distributions: 
𝑇𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 . −  𝐹𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟 . ,      (8) 
where the future values are calculated as (Long and Nickels 1996): 
𝐹𝑉𝑋 =  𝐶𝐹  1 + 𝑖𝑡 
𝑇−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0  ,       (9) 
and 
𝑖𝑡 =   
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑇− 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑡
 
1
𝑇−𝑡 
−  1         (10) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑇  represents the value of the public market index at the time 𝑇of reporting or 
liquidation, and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡  represents index values at time 𝑡, where contributions (distributions) 
are made. The equation for the terminal value shows that a fund which greatly outperforms 
the index will end up with a negative terminal value, i.e. a short position in the index.   
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Using the terminal value of the index comparable as the fund’s final cash flow, we get the 
index cash flows, which is identical to the fund’s cash flows except for the added terminal 
value. From the index cash flows, we can calculate an index IRR that is comparable to the 
IRR of the PE fund. A PE fund IRR in excess of the index IRR represents a time-weighted, 
amount-weighted performance in excess of the index. The ICM can therefore offer useful 
insight to an investor. A fund with a negative IRR may have an excess IRR compared to the 
index, indicating that the poor performance is more a result of a general downturn in the 
economy than the fund managers’ actions, and vice versa for a fund with a high IRR and a 
negative excess IRR. 
Contributions and distributions are compounded using multiple rates that reflect the same-
period return on the public index. This reduces the vulnerability to short term public market 
fluctuations that arises, when calculating the opportunity cost based on only two periods, in 
Ljungqvist and Richardson’s version of PI. 
The ICM assumes a beta of one for the PE fund, ignoring systematic risk. This assumption 
will cause the ICM to overstate (understate) the true risk-adjusted performance of the fund, 
given that the fund has a beta greater (less) than one. The index comparison may therefore be 
inappropriate, but Long and Nickels (1996: 7) defend the use of it stating:  “… it is equally 
inappropriate for all private investments and that it is therefore a neutral factor in judging 
among them (or judging among managers in a particular asset class)”. Another drawback with 
the ICM is the use of IRR. IRR has several pitfalls, one of them being that it cannot always be 
defined. 
3.3.4 The Kaplan and Schoar Public Market Equivalent 
A close relative to the ICM is the Public Market Equivalent (PME) used by Kaplan and 
Schoar (2003). It is simply the ratio of the future value of capital distributed by the PE fund to 
the future value of the capital invested into the PE fund, where both numerator and 
denominator are compounded at rates determined by the performance of an index from the 
date of the cash flow to the last reported date. 
𝑃𝑀𝐸 =  
𝐹𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟 .
𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 .
 ,         (11) 
where the future values are calculated as in equation 9 and 10. 
The PME is a multiple which accounts for the time-value of money as opposed to absolute 
multiples such as the TVPI recommended by the EVCA. The PME does not adjust for 
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differences in risk between PE funds, but the performance measure has several attractive 
attributes. First of all, the fraction is always defined. Secondly, it complements the excess IRR 
from the ICM in many ways like the TVPI does with the IRR. The higher the IRR gets, the 
less sensitive it gets to late distributions, an effect more noticeable for mature funds. Thus, 
mature funds that greatly outperform the index, indicated by large negative terminal values, 
may not rank high on excess IRR due to their interim cash flows which are also used to find 
the index IRR. For these funds, the PME will better reflect their true performance.    
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4. Dataset 
We have collected and constructed a dataset containing cash flow data from 71 funds for the 
purpose of studying how performance measures behave and rank funds, based on information 
available to LPs. The source is the records of several European PE investors operating in the 
Nordic region. We will refer to these investors as the “Limited Partners”. Confidentiality 
agreements do not allow us to identify the names of the Limited Partners, the fund managers 
or the specific funds. The dataset contains cash flow data from funds in which the Limited 
Partners have made investments as well as some in which the Limited Partners have not 
invested. 
The unique dataset allows us to precisely estimate performance of PE funds, net of fees and 
carried interest, for all performance measures. To our knowledge, the collected dataset is 
considerably larger than in previous studies from this geographical region. 
4.1 Constructing the Database 
Cash flow data collected from internal resources of the Limited Partners form the backbone in 
our analysis. The sample contains 71 funds managed by 23 fund managers. All fund managers 
have a locus of investments in the Nordic region. With the exception of 1992, the sample 
includes funds of every vintage, spanning the years from 1990 to 2008. The majority of funds 
are still active.  
Different currencies constitute a problem. In order to use the same cash flows when 
performing the analyses, all cash flows have been converted to Euros at mid-day exchange 
rates
2
. Cash flows before the adaption of the Euro have been converted at the first recorded 
mid-day exchange rates.  
The fund managers apply different time formats when reporting cash flows. Most apply the 
exact dates of cash flows, but some apply monthly or even quarterly cash flows. Incapable of 
separating these cash flows into daily cash flows, we treat them as single cash flows occurring 
at the specific date reported. 
For our purpose we would have liked to see cash flows split into contributions, distributions 
and NAV. Most funds apply this format, as proposed by the EVCA. Some funds have only 
reported a sum of contributions and distributions, making reliable separations between them 
                                                 
2
 Collected from Datastream Advance 4.0 
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difficult. This complicates calculation of multiples and ratios that relate these cash flows to 
committed capital. 
Cash flows and unrealized holdings in our database are as far as possible net of fees. 
However, because of the way some funds report cash flows and a lack of transparency in the 
calculation of unrealized holdings, fees remain as a potential source of upward bias when 
evaluating performance. 
4.2 Variable Description 
When possible, cash flows from each fund are separated into capital calls, distributions and 
NAV. The sum of these amounts to total cash flows. Realized cash flows are total cash flows 
less NAV. We have characterized each fund by certain variables; sequence number, age, 
vintage year, stage, status, and committed capital. A fund’s sequence number is the order in 
which the fund has been raised by the manager. We define vintage as the year in which the 
fund’s first cash flow appear. A fund’s status is deemed to be liquidated if reported liquidated 
by the GP or it satisfies both of the following criteria; its age is above 10 years and NAV 
constitutes less than 10 percent of committed capital. According to this definition of fund 
status, 53 funds are deemed active, while 18 are liquidated. 
Our dataset has been augmented by data from Thomson VentureXpert (2009). Committed 
capital has been found by matching the funds to this database. Some funds also report these 
figures. They generally match the VentureXpert data to a great degree. However, because we 
were able to find committed capital for all funds except for one in the VentureXpert database, 
we chose to use VentureXpert as a source for committed capital to promote uniformity. 
Stage represents the stage of development of the companies in which the fund makes the 
majority of its investments. These data are also gathered from VentureXpert. The dataset 
contains funds investing in the following stage categories; Development, Early Stage, 
Expansion, Later Stage, Balanced Stage, Generalist and Buyouts. However, once we separate 
funds by vintages we get few observations and having seven stages becomes unpractical. 
Since the VentureXpert categories Development and Early Stage share similar characteristics 
we will in our analyses group these stages together as Early Stage. For the same reason we 
group Expansion and Later Stage into Later Stage, even though Expansion may include 
buyout investments. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the sample, including the distribution of vintages, stage and 
committed capital, is presented in Table 1 and Table 2. Our dataset contains funds that are 
fairly dispersed when looking at fund vintages. The funds invest in companies in different 
stages of development, and the sample contains both venture and buyout funds. 
The combined commitments of the investigated funds amount to more than 22 billion Euros. 
Early stage funds account for 23.9 percent of the sample and 5.9 percent of committed capital. 
Later stage funds account for 16.9 percent of funds and 6.3 percent of commitments. Balanced 
stage and Generalist funds account for 12.7 and 9.9 percent of funds, and have similar average 
commitments that combine to just over 5 percent of the total. Buyout funds are considerably 
larger than the other funds, where 36.6 percent of the funds have commitments that account 
for 82.8 percent of the total. The average committed capital increases with vintage, even 
though the stage composition remains fairly unchanged. This is consistent with a general 
growth of the PE industry. 
Funds in our sample span from first time funds to funds with a sequence number of eight. We 
have been able to identify the sequence of all but one fund. The number of first time funds 
represents 18.3 percent of the sample. 23.9 are follow-on funds, 15.5 are third sequence and 
15.5 percent are fourth sequence funds. 22.5 percent are later sequence funds (Table 3). More 
obviously, the mean sequence number increases with the increase in vintage year. This 
development is natural, as the universe of later sequence funds increases. A LP may also 
increase the access to later sequence funds after having invested in an earlier sequence fund. 
The increase in later sequence funds over time may also contribute to explain the previously 
noted increase in average committed capital, as successful funds generally are able to raise 
more capital for follow-on funds (see Kaplan and Schoar 2003). 
Representativeness of the sample to the investment universe is not the main focus of this 
thesis, but rather how different performance measures compare funds. In spite of this, we will 
comment briefly on the subject. Whether the sample is representative for the Nordic PE 
market depends on the investment strategy of the Limited Partners. The Limited Partners may 
also possess inferior/superior skill in selecting funds or access to funds compared to other 
investors. However, our sample is not restricted to specific sequences and has a dispersed 
investment focus. Using only the stage categories we employ (Table 2), a comparison with all 
Northern European funds from 1990 to 2008 in the VentureXpert database reveals that 
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buyouts account for 22.8 percent of funds and 61.7 percent of committed capital. Thus, 
compared to the larger VentureXpert sample, Buyouts are overrepresented, while Early Stage, 
Balanced Stage and Generalist are underrepresented. Later Stage is overrepresented in terms 
of the number of funds, but only slightly in terms of committed capital. 
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5. Presence of Difficulties in Performance Measurement 
In section 3.1, we described difficulties related to performance measurement of PE funds. 
Now, we investigate the presence of these issues in our dataset. The primary performance 
measure we use to describe the difficulties of performance measurement in this section is the 
total IRR, which includes reported NAV as a final distribution, but the investigated issues are 
not restricted to this measure. 
5.1 Mean Performance and Benchmarking 
The full sample has a mean IRR of 16.43 percent and a median IRR of 8.60 percent (Table 4), 
implying that fund returns are right skewed or simply reflecting that we have a large number 
of young funds in our sample. Referring to the J-curve pattern, the mean performance of all 
funds is a dire description of PE performance since the inclusion of a large number of young 
funds will cause downward biased estimates of final performance of the funds. The only final 
IRRs are the ones reported for liquidated funds, which show a considerably higher mean than 
the active funds. For liquidated funds we find a mean IRR of 36.3 percent and a median IRR 
of 24.0 percent, while active funds have a mean IRR of 9.68 percent and a median IRR of 
7.36 percent. This indicates that PE fund returns in fact are right skewed, and that relatively 
few funds create a larger mass of returns.  
Mean IRRs are not a good description of industry performance, as it does not take into 
account the size of investments. To circumvent this problem and also take into account the 
time period in which the cash flows occur, we have calculated the pooled IRR of each 
vintage. This is a better benchmark for a fund of a specific vintage than the mean. The pooled 
IRR of all funds shows the IRR the LP would have achieved if he or she had invested an equal 
share of committed capital in all funds. It reveals an IRR close to 27 percent, which is higher 
than the full sample mean. 
5.2 Market Conditions and Return across Time 
As noted, comparing funds across time may produce wrong conclusions about performance. 
General market conditions and competition among PE funds will affect a fund’s ability to 
make profitable investments in portfolio companies. These variables are different from one 
year to another.  
Table 4 shows the IRR of PE funds in our sample broken down by vintage year and panels 
separating active from liquidated funds. Comparing the mean and median IRRs of the 98-00 
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vintages and 01-03 vintages, we see that the latter group of funds has performed considerably 
better. Knowing that IRRs usually increase with age, we can infer that the two groups of 
funds have faced different market conditions when making portfolio investments. Yet, this 
table highlights a difficulty in comparing fund performance; once the sample is broken down 
by vintage, the sample size becomes very small. 
The problem of comparing fund performance across time also manifests itself when looking at 
performance of funds sorted by age. We see from Table 5 that the youngest funds in our 
sample display negative mean IRRs, and that the mean IRRs increase with age. From Figure 1 
we see that this is consistent with the J-curve pattern. The early interim IRRs are not good 
indicators of final performance, and comparisons across young funds are made difficult 
because of few realizations.  
Table 6 shows cumulative contributions and distributions made by the funds in relation to 
committed capital, sorted by fund age. It supports the line of argument against comparing 
performance of young funds. The cash flows into the fund, contributions, approach committed 
capital in a fairly even rate across funds sorted by age, and are generally close to committed 
capital for funds of age above four. Distributions are zero for the youngest funds, and we see 
that there is a large shift between four and five year old funds. When funds have reached this 
age, they have distributed cash, and the interim IRRs will be a better indicator of 
performance.  
Those funds that have reached an age above 10, although few, display high distributions, 
suggesting that funds continue to distribute capital even though a fund has reached 10 years of 
age. Table 5 shows that these funds have a mean IRR of 36.89 percent and a median IRR of 
27.57 percent, which is noticeably higher than the mean and median IRR of 6.38 and 5.57 
percent for funds between the age of seven and 10 years. The large difference is reduced when 
comparing against funds aged between five and 10, which have a mean IRR of 18.81 percent 
and a median IRR of 11.66 percent, indicating that other factors, such as market conditions, 
could be part of the explanation. 
5.3 Differences in Sequence and Stage 
Expecting that GP performance increases with experience, we should see that later sequence 
funds have higher returns than early sequence funds. Since most LPs gain access to later 
sequence funds by investing in some of the early funds of the same GP, it is important that the 
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they do not reject fund managers solely on the basis of their first fund returning less than a 
benchmark that includes higher sequence funds.  
Table 7 is an expansion of Table 6, and shows the distributions also broken down by 
sequence. Comparing the groups of early and follow-on funds to higher sequence funds, we 
are unable to detect any systematic differences between the two groups. In a similar way, 
Table 8 is an expansion of Table 5, showing fund IRR also broken down by sequence. The 
apparent trend of decreasing IRRs with increasing vintages is an implication of the J-curve 
pattern and that the early sequence funds are older. Thus, in our data the mean IRR of all early 
sequence funds cannot be directly compared to mean IRR of all higher sequence funds. 
Table 9 shows performance broken down by investment stage. In our sample, funds classified 
as generalist or buyouts perform better than the other stages. Again, these figures should be 
interpreted with caution. Differences may in part be attributed to differences in the 
distribution of fund age, but buyouts still seem to outperform early stage funds when 
comparing funds across different age groups. The difference in performance between stages 
could also be caused by differences in risk characteristics or leverage, and if so, evaluating 
performance across stages without adjusting for risk will in rising markets favor those stages 
with higher systematic risk or leverage. Given the option-like payoff structure for GPs, 
measures that do not perform risk-adjustments will provide incentives for GPs to increase 
risk. Controlling for sequence or differences in systematic risk by making subdivisions by 
sequence or stage will, as when controlling for vintage, reduce the sample size.  
Possible determinants of performance should be investigated through regression analysis, and 
conclusions should not be drawn based on only one variable. This is highlighted by Table 10, 
showing fund performance by Committed Capital. It shows an apparent decreasing IRR with 
fund size, but this is not the only possible determinant of performance. We have already seen 
that commitments generally increase with vintage and that IRR decreases with vintage in our 
sample. Doing an extensive regression analysis, Kaplan and Schoar (2003) in fact find that 
performance increases with fund size. 
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6. Comparing Performance Measures 
In section 4, we presented several performance measures applied by either practitioners or 
academics when evaluating PE performance. We described the pitfalls related to the standard 
performance measures IRR and the multiple TVPI, and suggested the alternative performance 
measures, MIRR, PI, ICM and PME, that correct for some of these pitfalls. In the following 
two sections, we use our data to study the relationship between the performance measures, the 
severity of the pitfalls related to IRR and TVPI, and the improvements of the alternative 
performance measures. 
6.1 Ranked Statistics for the Full Sample 
This subsection presents how our sample of funds rank according to the seven performance 
measures IRR, TVPI, MIRR, PI, PME, ICM Excess IRR and ICM Excess MIRR. Due to the 
high percentage of funds that are still active, we choose to include the NAV as a final cash 
flow for all funds when calculating the performance measures. Three different specifications 
of the MIRR formula are applied, using hurdle rates of zero, eight and 12 percent. For the PI 
we use the annualized total return on the Morgan Stanley Capital International Nordic Index 
(MSNORDL - denoted MSCI Nordic) and the 10 year German Government Bond Index
3
 
(BMBD10Y), from the initial cash flow to last reporting date, as the respective risky and risk-
free alternative
4
. The future values used in PME, ICM Excess IRR and ICM Excess MIRR are 
all found by compounding the funds’ cash flows at rates determined by the performance of the 
MSCI Nordic from the dates of the cash flows to the last reported date.  
Among the sample of 71 funds, there are 10 funds where TVPI cannot be computed, for 
which we use a proxy
5
 based on the net cash flows. There are eight funds in our sample for 
which ICM Excess IRR cannot be calculated. Instances where ICM Excess IRR cannot be 
calculated normally coincide with good performance, and the funds missing ICM Excess IRR 
are all among the top 19 funds ranked by PME and the top 34 ranked by total IRR. This 
complicates the interpretation of rank correlation coefficients, since it is calculated on a 
different sample. However, comparisons with the other correlation coefficients still describe 
                                                 
3
 In lack of government bond indices covering the Nordics during the investigated period. 
4
 Collected from Datastream Advance 4.0 
5
 The proxy is found by running a regression with TVPI as dependent variable and a new multiple calculated as 
the sum of all net positive cash flows divided by the sum all net negative cash flows as the independent variable. 
The intercept and coefficient of the new multiple from the regression are then used to find the point estimates of 
TVPI as an equation of the new multiple.  
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the general properties of the measure. Due to the unobserved ICM Excess IRRs, we introduce 
the ICM Excess MIRR assuming a reinvestment rate of eight percent. 
For the alternative performance measures, MIRR, PI, PME and ICM, we use the same cost of 
capital for all funds, but the cost of capital varies between the measures. Given the differences 
in stage focus and leverage between funds, the use of one cost of capital across all funds will 
most likely either over- or understate the performance of the funds, depending on their 
systematic risk. We use a different cost of capital between the methods because we want to 
remain in line with the original articles from where we found the performance measures. Our 
intention is not to analyze the performance of the individual funds, but to analyze the 
relationship between the performance measures, and finding the true risk adjusted 
performance of a fund consequently becomes less relevant. 
6.1.1 Rank Correlation 
Table 11a shows the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the performance 
measures for the 71 funds in our sample. The rank correlation coefficients for IRR vary 
between 0.64 (ICM Excess IRR) and 0.97 (MIRR), with a mean of 0.86. The rank correlation 
coefficient between IRR and TVPI is 0.94, indicating that ranking funds by the standard 
performance measures would yield almost identical results. We find a lower rank correlation 
between the alternative performance measures. The lowest rank correlation coefficients come 
from ICM Excess IRR, which has a mean rank correlation of 0.70. Comparing the rank 
correlations between the MIRRs with different hurdle rates, we find a correlation very close to 
one. From this, we can establish that the different assumptions regarding hurdle rates hardly 
affect the ranking of funds by MIRR. 
We use Fisher’s z transformation6 to calculate the 99 percent confidence intervals for the rank 
correlation coefficients (Table 12). The lowest 99 percent confidence interval for the rank 
correlation coefficients is between the ICM Excess IRR and MIRR_12% (0.41 – 0.79). We 
therefore reject the hypothesis of independence of the two related rankings for all correlation 
coefficients. 
The rank correlations between IRR and the PI, PME, ICM Excess IRR and ICM Excess 
MIRR measures are noticeably smaller than for the TVPI and MIRR. An important difference 
between these groups of performance measures is that, while IRR, TVPI and MIRR measure 
                                                 
6
 In order to convert Spearman’s rank correlations to a normally distributed variable.  
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absolute performance, PI, PME, ICM Excess IRR and ICM Excess MIRR measure the 
relative performance of a fund to a benchmark.  
The implications of using absolute performance measures instead of relative performance 
measures are illustrated by comparing the rank correlations between the performance 
measures and the MSCI Nordic, where the MSCI Nordic is the annualized return on the same 
index from the funds’ first cash flow to their last reporting date. We see that the absolute 
performance measures have considerably higher rank correlation coefficients than the relative 
performance measures. The rank correlation coefficients between the absolute performance 
measures and the MSCI Nordic range between 0.41 (TVPI) and 0.44 (MIRR_12%), while the 
rank correlation coefficients range from  -0.15 (ICM Excess IRR) to 0.06 (ICM Excess 
MIRR) for the relative performance measures. Thus, it seems as the relative measures, 
although with high rank correlation coefficients to the absolute measures, to some degree 
adjust for the market conditions a fund operates in. The relative measures are therefore 
valuable tools for an investor who wants to evaluate performance of funds operating in 
different periods of time, which often is necessary due to lack of data.  
Correlations between the performance measures generally yield smaller coefficients (see 
Table 13a), than the ranked correlation. The correlation between IRR and TVPI is 0.64 in our 
sample consisting of 71 active and liquidated funds. This is comparable to Ljungqvist and 
Richardson’s (2003) result, when they find a correlation coefficient between the same 
measures of 0.59 for a sample of 73 mature funds. They conclude that the ranking of funds 
thus would be different. 
6.1.2 Ranked Performance 
Even though the rank correlation suggest small differences in how the funds rank by the 
performance measures IRR, TVPI and MIRR, Table 14a shows that they do not rank fund 
performance consistently, and a choice between the top five funds on the basis of the different 
performance measures would include different funds. The deviations are perhaps bigger than 
expected based on rank correlations. The two highest ranking funds by IRR are ranked as nine 
and 29 by TVPI. The large spread in the rankings of these funds illustrate some of the pitfalls 
related to IRR and TVPI; the reinvestment assumption could cause IRR to overstate the true 
performance, the TVPI could fail to adjust for the time-value and age of the fund, or it can be 
a combination of both. Normally, high IRRs together with low TVPIs indicate that returns 
were made over short periods. This is also the case here, where both funds are younger than 
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three years. The discrepancy between multiples and rate of return measures for young funds 
also appear among the alternative performance measures. We see that while MIRR and ICM 
Excess MIRR rank the same funds as IRR as top two, but in opposite order, PI and PME rank 
these funds in the range from five to 16.    
The rank correlations between the performance measures indicated a weaker relation between 
absolute measures and relative measures than between measures within these groups. A low 
rank correlation between relative performance measures and the MSCI Nordic further 
suggested that these measures to some degree control for the general market conditions a fund 
operates in. From table 14a we see examples of funds where part of the performance can be 
attributed to external factors as much as the GPs’ actions. One of these funds ranks as 29 by 
TVPI, but as six and five by the relative performance measures PI and PME, indicating a 
difficult investment environment. On the opposite side, the fund ranked as five by IRR is 
ranked as 18 by ICM Excess IRR, and fund performance is perhaps more a result of fortunate 
timing than the GP’s abilities. Not accounting for general market conditions, the absolute 
performance measures will have a tendency to overstate the performance of funds operating 
under favorable conditions, while punishing funds facing a difficult investment environment. 
6.2 Ranked Statistics for Funds Older than Four Years 
During the early years of a fund’s life, distributions are small and stale valuation may affect 
the NAV. Looking at funds with a short life may also cause the market related measures to 
produce results that are of little value when evaluating fund performance. To correct for this, 
we have excluded funds that are younger than four years. The cut-off value of four years 
reduces the sample to 44 funds. 
Table 11b shows the Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the reduced sample. Nine 
missing TVPIs are replaced by point estimates and there are seven funds for which we cannot 
compute ICM Excess IRR.   
In the reduced sample, the rank correlation between IRR and TVPI is increased to 0.98, while 
the coefficients against MIRR decrease and now range between 0.93 and 0.95. The decrease 
related to MIRR can be explained by an increased importance of the reinvestment assumption 
and that we in fact use Isolated MIRR
7
. Using Isolated MIRR, we expect high correlation 
between IRR and MIRR for young funds since the reinvestment rate do not affect young 
                                                 
7
 Phalippou (2008) denotes the MIRR we apply Isolated MIRR, which is the MIRR calculated between inception 
and date of reporting.   
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funds to the same degree. PI, PME and the ICM measures show increased rank correlation 
coefficients against the IRR. They also generally show higher coefficients in relation to each 
other and the other measures.  
The rank correlation coefficients against MSCI Nordic are reduced for all absolute measures, 
and now range between 0.02 (MIRR_0%) and 0.11(MIRR_12%). For the relative measures 
the same rank correlation coefficients become negative, varying between -0.30 (PI) and -0.09 
(ICM Excess MIRR). A problem with the MSCI Nordic is, however, that it is calculated as 
the annualized return between the inception and the reporting date of a fund, and therefore 
does not track the timing of the cash flows. The current turbulence following the financial 
crisis in 2007 – 2008 acts as an example of how this can cause problems when interpreting 
our results. Between the end of 2007 and the end of 2008 the MSCI Nordic fell by 46 percent, 
causing the annualized return on the MSCI Nordic to drop by several percentage points for 
many funds that are still active. Mature funds which realized the majority of their investments 
prior to the turmoil, will then rank low by their corresponding MSCI Nordic returns. At the 
same time, we know that investments prior to the stock market crash are associated with high 
returns resulting in high rankings by the absolute performance measures. 
The ranking of funds in the reduced sample is presented in Table 14b. 18 funds are shown, 
which correspond to just over 40 percent of the sample, and the top quartile consists of the 
first 11 funds. From the table we see that although the rank correlations are increased, the 
deviations in ranking between the performance measures are considerable for some funds.  
6.3 Consistency 
Based on the ranking of funds we see that the different measures often appraise the funds’ 
performance inconsistently. However, depending on the density of funds performing within a 
certain range, small deviations in performance between funds could cause large spreads in 
rank. When moving along the return distribution, the densities of funds within a specified 
range often change (see Figure 2). In our sample, the difference between the top performer, 
measured in terms of IRR, and the fund indicating the upper quartile is 154 percentage points, 
while the spread between the median and upper quartile is only 23 percentage points. In other 
words, there are larger differences in performance between funds along the tails of the return 
distribution.   
In this subsection, we investigate the consistency of performance measures with the latter in 
mind. The means by which we do this is to compare how performance measures differ in the 
34 
 
ranking of funds after separating funds into quartiles by IRR. Table 15 shows how the other 
measures deviate from IRR in ranking funds that belong to these quartiles. We see a general 
picture of more consistency in ranking across measures among funds in the top and bottom 
quartile, compared to funds that are closer to the median. A practical implication of this is that 
a fund classified as a top performer by one measure is more likely to receive a similar rank by 
another measure, than when it belongs to the middle quartiles.  
MIRR seems to deviate from this general picture. The cause of this deviation is that when IRR 
is close to the reinvestment rate used in MIRR, the two performance measures will yield 
almost identical results. We assumed a reinvestment rate of eight percent, and funds with 
IRRs close to this reinvestment rate are placed in the second quartile. This is also the quartile 
were we experience the lowest deviations.  
GPs often claim that their fund is a top quartile fund, but at a given point of time, only 25 
percent of funds can actually claim to be just that. Wang and Conner (2004), who unlike us 
have access to data that contain historical NAVs, determine the probability of a fund being in 
the top quartile in at least one year during its life by either IRR or TVPI, to be over 60 
percent. Table 16 shows the overlap in funds, at our investigated point of time, according to a 
larger number of performance measures, and elaborates on ranked performance. None of the 
measures includes the exact same funds in the top quartile and the lowest agreement between 
two measures is 11 out of 18 funds. The total amount of funds that is defined as top quartile 
by at least one of the measures is as high as 29, representing over 40 percent of the total 
sample. This means that the probability of being defined as top quartile at some point of time 
will increase to an even higher rate, and shows the weak efficiency of generic selection rules 
like choosing top quartile funds based on only one measure. From this we can establish that 
appraisal of fund performance should include the use of several performance measures. 
In order to account for differences related to age, we also investigate consistency among 
performance measures when describing a fund’s performance relative to the median vintage 
performance. In Table 17a, we list the ratios in which two different measures at the same time 
determine that funds have performed either better or worse than their corresponding vintage 
medians, denoted Consistency Ratio (CR). Vintages with only one fund are left out of the 
analysis. A weakness of this procedure is that once we separate funds by vintage, the number 
of funds in each vintage becomes very small and that a bigger sample might produce different 
results. 
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We find that 54 out of 68 funds are evaluated consistently across all measures. CRs for the 
pairwise comparisons are close 0.90, indicating that on average nine out of 10 funds receive 
similar appraisals by the two measures with respect to the median. Both the highest and 
lowest ratios are related to PME. The highest ratio, 0.96, is between PME and PI, and the 
lowest, 0.85, is between PME and MIRR_8%. Consistency Ratios between two measures 
generally increase as we restrict the sample to funds above four years of age, and they are all 
above 0.90 (Table 17 b). These results indicate that when we account for vintage, some of the 
inconsistency across performance measure will be reduced, and the overlap of top quartile 
funds will increase.  
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7. Investigating Pitfalls Related to Performance Measures 
In this section we analyze the severity of pitfalls related to performance measures, with an 
emphasis on the standard measures IRR and TVPI. We also discuss the degree in which the 
alternative performance measures improve on these pitfalls. 
7.1 Calculation Issues 
In our sample we are able to find the IRR for all funds when we include NAV as a final cash 
flow. However, NAVs are reported accounting values and not observed market values, and 
therefore a potential source of bias in our performance estimates. Realized IRR, which 
excludes NAV, are unidentified for 25 out 71 funds. The problem is normally limited to 
young funds, indicated by a mean age for these funds of 2.5 years. ICM Excess IRRs are 
unidentified for eight funds, for which seven are older than four years. The common factor for 
these funds is a large negative cash flow related to the terminal value of the index investment 
at the end of the reporting period.  
Statistical software such as Excel allows for suggestions of the sign in front of IRR. And by 
doing so, one should be able to minimize the “Lending versus Borrowing” problem. When 
held together with Gross Return
8
 we find no funds with opposite signs between Gross Return 
and Total IRR, indicating that IRR interprets the cash flows correctly in our sample of funds. 
7.2 Reinvestment Assumption 
IRR will not equal the effective rate of return unless all distributions are reinvested at the IRR 
rate. A consequence of this is that IRR will exaggerate fund performance when IRR becomes 
very high or very low. To test how the IRR exaggerates the funds’ performance in our sample, 
we have calculated the funds’ TVPIs, had all distributions been reinvested at the funds’ IRRs. 
The changes in TVPI are listed in Table 18 together with the mean IRR, and sorted by age. 
We see that the effect of the reinvestment rate increases with age and IRR. For the 17 year old 
fund with an IRR of 70 percent, the change in TVPI is 3 238. The table also shows that the 
median change is of small economic significance. This is consistent with IRR exaggerating 
fund performance for extreme observations. IRRs close to the median are more likely to 
resemble the effective rate of return. The main emphasis of this table should therefore be put 
on the max and minimum observations. 
                                                 
8
 Gross Return equals distributions plus net asset value minus contributions 
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MIRR effectively reduces the noise in fund performance caused by the underlying 
reinvestment assumption in IRR. By setting a more realistic reinvestment rate, dispersion in 
fund returns will be reduced and the rate of return is more likely to reflect the effective rate of 
return achieved by the fund. Table 19 shows how MIRR improves on IRR regarding the 
reinvestment assumption. MIRR with three different reinvestment rate assumptions (zero, 
eight and 12 percent) are displayed. The spread between the third and first quartile for MIRR, 
assuming a 12 percent reinvestment rate, is 17.8 percentage points, more than 20 percentage 
points lower than that of IRR (38.94). 
The large dispersion in fund returns, together with the documented persistence in fund 
performance (Kaplan and Schoar 2004), separates PE from other asset classes such as mutual 
funds, where persistence, if detected, is usually driven by underperformance. The same 
authors find that on average, Leveraged Buyout funds return slightly less than S&P 500 net of 
fees, while VC fund returns are lower on an equal-weighted basis, but higher on a capital 
weighted basis. These results, however, do not explicitly adjust for differences in systematic 
risk or liquidity risk. Performing risk-adjustments, Gottschalg and Phalippou (2005) find that 
PE funds substantially underperform net-of fees with respect to the S&P 500. 
Most investors are aware of the weak aggregated performance, but invest in PE because of the 
documented persistence. Though aggregated performance is weak, top quartile funds usually 
display excess returns to the public markets, at least when systematic risk is unaccounted for. 
This is also true for our data where the third quartile PME is 1.64. Given the persistence, all 
the investor has to do is to identify the GPs of top quartile funds and invest in these fund 
managers’ consecutive funds. Kreuter and Gottschalg (2006) test the efficiency of possible 
selection criteria. They find that the generic rule of investing only in funds of GPs whose most 
recent fund ranks in the top quartile would increase the weighted average IRR by just above 
three percentage points relative to a random selection of funds. This seems low compared to 
the IRR spreads we observe between the third quartile funds and the median funds for each 
vintage year in table 4. 
The small gain achieved by following the generic rule of backing the top quartile GPs, could 
be a result of several factors. We have shown that fund performance to some degree varies 
between the different performance measures. A top quartile fund by IRR may not be a top 
quartile fund by PME or ICM Excess IRR. Further, the dispersion in fund returns is decreased 
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when more realistic reinvestment rates are assumed in MIRR. Variation in GPs’ abilities 
could therefore be exaggerated by different measures.  
There are also some concerns related to the documented persistence by Kaplan and Schoar 
(2004). One of these is that overlapping investments and time periods across funds can induce 
persistence. The authors are aware of this, and conduct robustness checks indicating that the 
persistent results are not caused by either investment overlap or time period overlap. 
However, the authors are using historical performance to test for persistence ex post, using 
information investors do not have when the investment decision is being made. When testing 
possible selection criteria and their efficiency, Kreuter and Gottshalg (2006) only use 
information available to the investor at the time of investing. They then compare the result of 
investing in funds based on the information an investor has at the time of the investment to the 
ex post results. As mentioned, the generic rule of investing only in funds of GPs whose most 
recent fund ranks in the top quartile, gave an excess return of three percentage points 
compared to that of random selection. By altering the criteria to account for all of the GPs 
previous funds, the spread in IRR between the generic rule and the random selection increases 
to 4.5 percentage points.  
The ”low” excess returns accrued is consistent with the findings of Wang and Chenner 
(2004), who show that 62 percent of the funds in their sample was either ranked top quartile 
by IRR or TVPI at some point during their lifetime. In addition, funds ranked as top quartile 
after five years have a likelihood of ending up in the top quartile just above 50 percent. Thus, 
even if persistence in fund performance exists, the information available to the investor at the 
time of investing may not be a good indicator about future performance. Unfortunately, our 
data is not sufficient to further investigate persistence in fund returns, or test if it is possible to 
predict fund returns by information available to the investors at the time of the investment.  
7.3 Neglecting Time-Value of Money 
Multiples illustrate the value returned per unit invested, and are practical measures for an 
investor who wants to get a quick impression of a fund’s performance. However, since they 
neglect the time-value of money, evaluating funds solely on these multiples may lead to 
wrong conclusions. Using the quasi consensus hurdle rate of 8 percent as an effective rate of 
return, would yield a multiple of 2.16 after 10 years if all capital was invested at inception and 
paid out at the end. A fund that doubles the investors’ money may therefore have a negative 
NPV, depending on the timing and amounts of the cash flows and assumptions about the cost 
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of capital. The easiest way to achieve a multiple that accounts for the time-value of money is 
to assume a cost of capital and divide the NPV of cash flows by the PV of contributions, 
which is what the PI does. In the following, we use the PI to test whether a TVPI multiple of 
two, which Phalippou (2007) notes that LPs seem satisfied with, should be considered 
satisfactory. 
Unobservable TVPIs are replaced with point estimates as explained in Section 6.1. Further, 
we assume the 15 percent cost of capital suggested by Metrick (2007: 79) for venture capital 
and find the new PI (PI 15%) for each fund. Ranking funds from high to low based on TVPI, 
we want to find the lowest ranking fund that has a positive PI, and from which all funds above 
it have positive PIs. From Table 20 we see that this cut-off fund is 10 years old, has a TVPI of 
1.99 and is ranked as number 23. The age of the 23 highest ranking funds vary between two 
and 17 with a mean of 8.1. The cut-off fund only marks the lowest TVPI multiple from which 
all funds above have positive PIs. In fact, eight funds with lower TVPIs have positive PIs. The 
age of these funds vary between two and 14 with a mean of 5.5. 
In relation to the eight percent effective rate of return multiple of 2.16, it is interesting to 
observe that, even with a cost of capital of 15 percent, three funds aged above 10 and with 
multiples below 2.16 have positive PIs. The mismatch can be explained by the cash flow 
characteristics of PE investments. The eight percent effective rate of return multiple assumes 
that all capital is invested at the inception of the fund and returned after 10 years. Table 6 
shows that this assumption poorly describes the cash flow characteristics of PE funds. On 
average, they invest in fairly even rates during the first years with contributed capital 
approaching committed capital after four years. Distributions are in general made from year 
three, and become larger than committed capital from year five. Thus, the effective 
investment periods are shorter than the funds’ age, and comparing the simplified effective rate 
of return multiples to TVPI will underestimate the performance of funds. 
In order to find a TVPI that corresponds to a positive PI 15%, given the age of the fund and 
the cash flow characteristics of PE investments, we run an OLS regression with PI 15% as the 
dependent variable and age and TVPI as independent variables. The regression coefficients of 
age and TVPI are -0.0422 and 0.618 with an intercept of -0.655. Based on the regression 
coefficients, we find the TVPIs that return PIs equal to zero, given the age of the fund. For 10 
year old funds, the required TVPI becomes 1.74, which is lower than the 1.99 TVPI of the 
cut-off fund. Comparing the observed TVPIs to the estimates of required TVPIs, given the 
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age of the funds, we find that the residuals give the same qualitative interpretation as the 
observed PIs for 66 funds. Three funds with positive residuals have negative PIs, and two 
funds with negative residuals have positive PIs. 
The simple regression above suggests that funds younger than 14 years returning a TVPI 
above two have positive PIs assuming a cost of capital of 15 percent. Together with the 
observation of all funds with TVPIs above 1.99 having positive PIs, a TVPI of two could be 
considered satisfactory. However, this is meant as rule of thumb, and all funds should be 
evaluated separately by PI or other performance measures. 
7.4 Strategic Timing and Sensitivity to Additional Distributions 
When evaluating fund performance, measures that align the interests of LPs and GPs should 
be used in order to prevent opportunistic behavior from the GP. To illustrate the potential 
severity of these issues, we study how the performance measures behave when an additional 
distribution is offered at two different points in a fund’s life. In our first scenario the 
additional distribution is paid out three years after the funds first cash flow, representing an 
attempt of strategic timing of the cash flow. In the second scenario, the additional cash flow is 
offered as a final cash flow 10 years after inception, to see how sensitive the different 
performance measures are to late distributions.  
The funds we use are both 1998 vintages and have IRRs of 17 and 31 percent which roughly 
represents the full sample mean and the upper quartile. Table 21 displays the funds’ observed 
performance together with the performance following the additional distribution after three or 
10 years. The additional distribution varies from 11 to 91 percent of committed capital. The 
table also relates the NPV of the distribution in year 10 to the distribution in year three, after 
assuming a cost of capital of 12 percent. For example, a distribution of 51 percent of 
committed capital 10 years from inception has a NPV equal to 23 percent of committed 
capital paid out in year three.  
From the table, we see that IRR is highly sensitive to the timing of the cash flows. In the first 
scenario, the IRR almost doubles for fund A, and more than doubles for fund B, following a 
distribution of 91 percent of committed capital. The same distribution will only increase the 
IRRs with 10 and 26 percent respectively, if it is paid out after 10 years. The NPV of the late 
distribution is 0.41 percent of committed capital, less than half of the NPV, if it is paid out in 
year three. The reduced increases in the IRRs are therefore partly a reflection of the reduced 
NPV. However, we see that IRRs following an early distribution of 23 percent of committed 
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capital are equal to or higher than those of the late distribution of 91 percent of committed 
capital for both funds. Based on IRR, GPs in these funds will therefore prefer the distribution 
of 23 percent of committed capital in year three, even though it means giving up a NPV equal 
to 18 percent of committed capital.  
In contrast to IRR, which can induce GPs to exit investments too early, TVPI can cause GPs 
to exit investments too late. TVPI is maximized when investments are held until absolute 
returns become negative, regardless of the time-value of money. We see from the table that, 
while going from a 51 percent of committed capital distribution in year three to a 91 percent 
of committed capital distribution in year 10 reduces the NPV by 10 percent of committed 
capital, TVPI increases with nine percent for fund A and 13 percent for fund B. 
Though complementing IRR with TVPI as performance measures may provide the GPs with 
incentives more aligned with the interests of the LPs, the fact that none of them assumes a 
cost of capital ex ante calls for the use of alternative performance measures. Table 21 shows 
that all of the alternative performance measures favor the highest NPV solution, but to 
varying degrees. MIRR with a reinvestment rate of 12 percent shows only marginally higher 
values, choosing the late 0.91 alternative over the 0.23 pay-out after three years.  
Table 21 also shows the weakness of IRR in providing incentives as funds reach a mature age. 
An additional distribution of 91 percent of committed capital will increase IRR from 31 to 34 
percent for fund A, and from 17 to 21 percent for fund B. This corresponds to the 10 and 26 
percent increases mentioned earlier. Comparing these percentage increases to those of the 
alternative performance measures, we see that except for MIRR, all of the alternative 
performance measures have higher percentage increases than IRR, indicating a higher 
sensitivity to late distributions. Table 22 displays the mean percentage change in performance 
for mature funds with IRRs higher than 10 percent, following a distribution of one percent of 
committed capital at the reporting date. Although the mean percentage change for IRR is 
higher than some of the alternative performance measures, we confirm that the alternative 
measures do have higher sensitivity to late distribution by comparing the minimum and 
median changes, which are higher than IRR for all measures 
Even if the alternative performance measures favor the highest NPV solution and in general 
show a higher sensitivity to late distributions, Table 21 illustrates issues that need to be 
addressed. PI, PME and the ICM Excess measures are all linked to the return on the MSCI 
Nordic index. This link will in some situations lead to misguided performance appraisals. For 
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example, we see that the PI for fund B is more than twice as large as that of fund A in spite of 
fund A having a higher IRR and TVPI than fund B. Only nine months separate the funds 
initial cash flows, and using an index return as the cost of capital seems fair. However, fund A 
has last reporting date at the end of 2007, while fund B has last reporting date at the end of 
2008. Between these reporting dates the MSCI Nordic plummeted by 46 percent, causing the 
discount rate for distributions to fall from 11.5 to 3.5 percent. The turbulence also caused the 
discount rate for contributions to increase from 4.9 to 5.3 percent. The higher PI for fund B is 
therefore a result of more favorable discount rates. Both PME and ICM Excess MIRR 
evaluate the performance of fund A to be greater than fund B. The difference between the PI, 
the PME and the ICM measures is that the last two control for the timing of the cash flows, 
while PI only uses the inception date and reporting date as reference points when finding the 
opportunity cost of not investing in a public market. The conflicting results, together with the 
lower rank correlations for PI, illustrate the importance of having benchmarks that control for 
the timing of the cash flows. 
Although PME and ICM Excess IRR consider the timing of the cash flows, we see that these 
measures are also capable of misinterpreting performance. For fund B, these measures show a 
higher response to a late distribution than an early distribution, despite the early distribution 
having a NPV more than twice as large as the late distribution. The controversial response is a 
consequence of the late distribution coming after the plunge in the MSCI Nordic, thereby 
having a relatively larger effect on the terminal value of the index portfolio.       
MIRR is calculated independently of market returns and even though it does not improve 
much on IRR concerning late distributions, it provides the GPs with the incentives to keep 
investments until the marginal return equals the assumed cost of capital. However, in contrast 
to IRR, MIRR also show small changes following an early distribution. While an early 
distribution of 91 percent of committed capital increases IRR by almost 30 percentage points 
for fund A, MIRR increases by only 4 percentage points. Further, deferring the distribution 
seven years and losing more than half of the NPV, only reduces the MIRR by 2 percentage 
points. Unless LPs realize that small increases in MIRR imply significant value enhancement, 
good performance will not be properly appreciated. As a consequence, MIRR may not 
provide the adequate incentives for the GP, who might feel incapable of affecting the 
performance.  
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8. Conclusion 
Based on a unique dataset of PE funds raised between 1990 and 2008, we analyze how the 
choice of performance measures shape the appraisal of fund performance. Having cash flows 
with exact dates, net of fees and carried interest, we are able to compare the standard 
performance measures, IRR and TVPI, to the alternative performance measures MIRR, PI, 
ICM and PME, from a LP perspective. The cash flows also enable us to document 
characteristics of PE investments which complicate appraisal of fund performance.  
In general it takes four years for funds to be fully invested, while distributions are paid out 
from year three throughout the fund’s life, making performance measurement difficult by any 
measure until the fund reaches a mature age. Furthermore, we document large variation in 
vintage performance, and some differences in performance between investment stage, 
suggesting that fund performance should be evaluated on a same vintage and stage basis. This 
often reduces the number of comparable funds for the limited partner. 
We document high rank correlations coefficients between the six performance measures, 
indicating that ranking the funds by the different performance measures would yield almost 
identical results. However, the rank correlation against the MSCI Nordic illustrates an 
important difference between the performance measures. While the absolute performance 
measures IRR, TVPI and MIRR have rank correlations close to 0.4, the relative performance 
measures PI, ICM and PME have rank correlation coefficients closer to zero, showing their 
attempt at explaining performance in the relation to a public index. 
Although rank correlations among the different performance measures are high, we see that 
different funds are included in a portfolio of top quartile funds. The appraisal of fund 
performance is thus different. Leaving out young funds, whose performance is difficult to 
measure because of the cash flow characteristics of PE, will increase correlation between the 
performance measures and also increase rank correlation slightly. This specification leads to a 
generally higher degree of consistency in choosing top performers between the measures. 
Even so, the fact that the performance measures are not fully consistent when ranking funds, 
leads to more than 40 percent of the funds in our sample qualifying as top quartile fund by at 
least one of the performance measures. This can in part explain the weak efficiency of the 
generic selection rule of investing in funds of GPs, whose previous funds rank as top quartile.  
Finally, we illustrate how the reinvestment rate assumption underlying IRR causes fund 
performance to appear more dispersed than they truly are. The alternative measures improve 
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on IRR in providing incentives to keep investments that return above the cost of capital. 
However, the relative performance measures introduce new difficulties related to the 
benchmark, which under certain circumstances yields misguided performance appraisal. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1 
 
  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - Stage and Committed Capital
Early 
Stage
Later 
Stage
Balanced 
Stage
Gener-
alist Buyouts Total Mean Median
1990 5 2 1 2 5 100 20 10
1991 1 1 1 * * *
1993 2 1 1 1 * * *
1994 1 1 1 * * *
1995 1 1 1 * * *
1996 3 1 1 1 3 90 30 25
1997 4 2 1 1 4 220 55 50
1998 10 2 3 1 4 10 1 400 140 65
1999 2 1 1 2 270 135 135
2000 3 1 1 1 3 900 300 55
2001 5 1 2 2 5 250 50 45
2002 4 1 1 2 4 700 175 170
2003 4 2 2 4 2 200 550 375
2004 3 2 1 3 135 45 45
2005 6 1 1 1 3 6 1 170 195 155
2006 9 2 2 5 9 9 405 1 045 405
2007 4 1 1 1 1 4 520 130 100
2008 4 2 2 4 5 000 1 250 315
Total 71 17 12 9 7 26 70 22 467.9 321.0 79.5
% 100 % 23.9 % 16.9 % 12.7 % 9.9 % 36.6 % 98.6 %
The dataset contains cash flow data from 71 private equity funds, raised between 1990 and 2008, managed by 23 fund managers.  
The source is the records of the Limited Partners. The table shows the sample broken down by vintage year and fund investment 
stage. 23.9 % of the funds are classified as Early Stage funds, 16.9 % as Later Stage, 12.7 % as Balanced Stage, 9.9 % as Generalist, 
and 36.6% Buyouts. The classifications are the ones reported by VentureXpert, except that Early Stage also includes the 
VentureXpert category Development and that Later Stage also includes the VentureXpert category Expansion. Vintage year is 
determined by the first reported cash flow. The table also shows total committed capital by limited partners in the funds, as 
reported by VentureXpert, for each Vintage. All monetary numbers are in nominal Euros. To protect the identy of funds, 
committed capital is not listed when the fund is the only one in its vintage (*) and total, mean and median committed capital for 
each vintage are rounded to the closest five.
Vintage 
Year
Sample 
Size
Stage Breakdown - No of funds Funds 
with CC 
data
Committed Capital (MEUR Nominal)
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Table 2 
 
  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics - Stage and Committed Capital
Total Sample Size: 71 71
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Committed Cap. (CC) 321.0 79.5 78.8 52.0 117.9 66.9 68.8 15.3 74.4 48.0 717.4 248.4
Total CC 22 467.9 1 261.4 1 414.3 619.1 521.1 18 652.0
Funds 70 16 12 9 7 26
% of funds 98.6 % 22.5 % 16.9 % 12.7 % 9.9 % 36.6 %
% of CC 100.0 % 5.6 % 6.3 % 2.8 % 2.3 % 83.0 %
% of funds. VX. N. Eur 100.0 % 41.5 % 7.2 % 21.0 % 7.5 % 22.8 %
% of CC. VX. N. Eur 100.0 % 11.9 % 5.6 % 12.4 % 8.4 % 61.7 %
Table 2 shows Committed Capital broken down by investment stage for the total sample. We were not able to find Committed 
Capital for one of the Early Stage funds, causing the size of the category to be slightly understated. Combined commitments are 
approx. 22 billion Euros, of which 5.6 % are Early Stage, 6.3 % Later Stage, 2.8% Balanced Stage, 2.3% Generalist and 83.0 % 
Buyout stage investments. Also stated are numbers for all Northern European funds of the same categories for the vintages 1990-
2008, collected from VentureXpert. The classifications are the ones reported by VentureXpert, except that Early Stage also 
includes the VentureXpert category Development and that Later Stage also includes the VentureXpert category Expansion. 
Compared to this, Buyouts and Later Stage are overrepresented, while Early Stage, Balanced Stage and Generalist are 
underrepresented in our sample.
BuyoutsEarly Stage
Stage Breakdown - Committed Capital (MEUR Nominal)
All Stages Later Stage Balanced Stage Generalist
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Table 3 
 
  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics - Fund Status and Sequence Number
Active Liquidated N/A 1 2 3 4 S>4
1990 5 5 4 1 1.2
1991 1 1 1 3.0
1993 2 2 1 1 1.5
1994 1 1 1 2.0
1995 1 1 1 -
1996 3 1 2 1 1 1 2.7
1997 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 3.0
1998 10 6 4 3 4 1 1 1 2.4
1999 2 2 1 1 4.0
2000 3 3 1 1 1 4.7
2001 5 5 2 1 2 2.0
2002 4 4 2 2 5.3
2003 4 4 1 2 1 3.5
2004 3 3 2 1 2.7
2005 6 6 2 2 2 4.2
2006 9 9 3 2 1 3 3.6
2007 4 4 1 1 2 4.0
2008 4 4 1 1 2 4.8
Total 71 53 18 1 13 17 13 11 16 3.2
% 100 % 74.6 % 25.4 % 1.4 % 18.3 % 23.9 % 18.3 % 15.5 % 22.5 %
Vintage 
Year
Sample 
Size
Fund Status
Table 3 shows the sample broken down by vintage year, fund status and sequence. A fund’s status is deemed to be liquidated if 
reported liquidated by the general partner or if it satisfies both of the following criteria; age is above 10 years and unrealized 
holdings constitute less than 10 per cent of committed capital. 53 funds are active, while 18 are deemed liquidated. The funds in 
our sample span from first time funds to funds with a sequence number of 8. One fund has an undefined sequence number, 
18.3% are first time funds, 23.9% are follow-on funds, 15.5 % are third sequence, 15.5% are fourth sequence funds and 22.5% are 
later-sequence funds.
Sequence No.
Mean 
Sequence 
No.
52 
 
Table 4 
 
Table 4. Fund Performance by Vintage Year
Mean SE Mean StDev Min.
First 
quartile Median
Third 
quartile Max. Pooled 
Panel A: Whole Sample
1990 5 5 26.90 19.40 43.40 -32.70 -10.00 15.40 69.60 70.00 38.80
1991 1 1 -6.39 - - -6.39 - -6.39 - -6.39 -6.38
1993 2 2 57.20 26.10 37.00 31.00 - 57.20 - 83.30 53.42
1994 1 1 55.79 - - - - 55.79 - 55.79 55.83
1995 1 1 185.76 - - - - 185.76 - 185.76 187.66
1996 3 3 41.80 17.40 30.10 7.40 7.40 54.90 63.10 63.10 36.48
1997 4 4 45.20 29.20 58.30 -7.50 -5.60 38.20 102.80 111.60 19.84
1998 10 10 5.31 5.30 16.76 -24.92 -6.59 6.19 18.84 30.70 20.34
1999 2 2 6.77 8.49 12.00 -1.71 - 6.77 - 15.26 9.90
2000 3 3 9.07 7.32 12.68 -3.06 -3.06 8.05 22.23 22.23 20.49
2001 5 5 35.99 9.87 22.06 11.66 15.46 31.52 58.77 61.67 35.81
2002 4 4 37.10 17.00 34.00 -2.10 4.80 36.10 70.40 78.40 37.77
2003 4 4 34.00 14.80 29.50 -1.20 4.90 35.00 62.00 67.20 33.10
2004 3 3 0.53 6.34 10.98 -12.08 -12.08 5.70 7.96 7.96 2.07
2005 6 6 12.80 14.60 35.70 -13.20 -11.50 -3.60 41.80 78.10 6.20
2006 9 9 17.00 15.00 45.00 -23.30 -9.30 7.40 23.10 129.30 5.13
2007 4 4 -43.70 9.79 19.58 -66.52 -62.39 -44.12 -24.59 -20.04 -43.43
2008 4 4 -59.30 16.20 32.50 -93.20 -87.00 -64.40 -26.60 -15.40 -24.58
Total 71 71 16.43 5.37 45.29 -93.17 -7.42 8.60 31.52 185.76 26.98
% 100 % 100.0 %
Panel B: Liquidated Funds
1990 5 5 26.90 19.40 43.40 -32.70 -10.00 15.40 69.60 70.00
1991 1 1 -6.39 - - -6.39 - -6.39 - -6.39
1993 2 2 57.20 26.10 37.00 31.00 - 57.20 - 83.30
1994 1 1 55.79 - - 55.79 - 55.79 - 55.79
1995 1 1 185.76 - - 185.76 - 185.76 - 185.76
1996 2 2 59.01 4.08 5.76 54.94 - 59.01 - 63.09
1997 2 2 34.50 41.90 59.30 -7.50 - 34.50 - 76.40
1998 4 4 -4.28 8.57 17.13 -24.92 -20.12 -4.59 11.86 16.97
Total 18 18 36.30 12.40 52.50 -32.70 -5.90 24.00 69.30 185.80
% 25.4 % 25.4 %
Panel C: Active Funds
1996 1 1 7.36 - - 7.36 - 7.36 - 7.36
1997 2 2 55.90 55.80 78.90 0.10 - 55.90 - 111.60
1998 6 6 11.70 5.87 14.38 -9.22 0.53 10.26 26.01 30.70
1999 2 2 6.77 8.49 12.00 -1.71 - 6.77 - 15.26
2000 3 3 9.07 7.32 12.68 -3.06 -3.06 8.05 22.23 22.23
2001 5 5 35.99 9.87 22.06 11.66 15.46 31.52 58.77 61.67
2002 4 4 37.10 17.00 34.00 -2.10 4.80 36.10 70.40 78.40
2003 4 4 34.00 14.80 29.50 -1.20 4.90 35.00 62.00 67.20
2004 3 3 0.53 6.34 10.98 -12.08 -12.08 5.70 7.96 7.96
2005 6 6 12.80 14.60 35.70 -13.20 -11.50 -3.60 41.80 78.10
2006 9 9 17.00 15.00 45.00 -23.30 -9.30 7.40 23.10 129.30
2007 4 4 -43.70 9.79 19.58 -66.52 -62.39 -44.12 -24.59 -20.04
2008 4 4 -59.30 16.20 32.50 -93.20 -87.00 -64.40 -26.60 -15.40
Total 53 53 9.68 5.63 40.95 -93.17 -10.09 7.36 25.39 129.34
% 74.6 % 74.6 %
Vintage
Sample 
Size
Funds 
with IRR 
data
Internal Rate of Return (In Percent)
The table shows fund performance measured by the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), net of fees, sorted by vintage year. IRRs are 
calculated from the date of the first recorded cash flow to the end of the fund's life or last reporting date. Incapable of separating 
montly or quarterly cash flows reported by some managers into daily cash flows, we treat them as single cash flows occurring at 
the specific date reported. Vintage year is determined by the first reported cash flow. Pooled vintage performance is shown for the 
total sample, and is calculated using end-of month cash flows. The total sample displays a mean IRR of 16.43 %, while liquidated 
funds display a mean of 36.30 %. 
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Table 5. Fund Performance by Fund Age
Mean SE Mean StDev Min.
First 
quartile Median
Third 
quartile Max.
0 2 2 -54.30 38.90 55.00 -93.20 - -54.30 - -15.40
1 4 4 -53.80 11.40 22.80 -68.40 -67.90 -63.50 -30.10 -20.00
2 8 8 18.50 21.00 59.30 -50.00 -29.50 5.80 63.80 129.30
3 9 9 19.80 21.60 64.90 -23.30 -14.20 -7.40 27.50 185.80
4 6 6 9.45 6.45 15.79 -12.08 -2.86 6.83 25.44 31.52
5 5 5 54.26 3.78 8.45 46.62 46.65 54.94 61.52 67.18
6 6 6 19.10 12.50 30.60 -3.10 -2.40 9.00 38.20 76.40
7 8 8 31.40 11.60 32.80 -3.50 4.90 16.90 67.30 78.40
8 3 3 -9.70 13.10 22.70 -32.70 -32.70 -9.20 12.60 12.60
9 6 6 -2.86 5.63 13.79 -24.92 -11.83 -3.71 9.34 15.26
10 7 7 12.33 4.93 13.04 -6.39 0.06 11.92 24.45 30.70
11 1 1 111.64 - - 111.64 - 111.64 - 111.64
12 1 1 63.09 - - 63.09 - 63.09 - 63.09
13 1 1 83.32 - - 83.32 - 83.32 - 83.32
14 2 2 43.40 12.40 17.50 31.00 - 43.40 - 55.80
16 1 1 15.36 - - 15.36 - 15.36 - 15.36
17 1 1 69.98 - - 69.98 - 69.98 - 69.98
Total 71 71 16.43 5.37 45.29 -93.17 -7.42 8.60 31.52 185.76
% 100 % 100.0 %
Subdivisons by Age
5-10 years 27 27 18.81 5.89 30.59 -32.67 -3.06 11.66 46.69 78.36
% of total 38.0 %
7-10 years 14 14 6.38 6.23 23.30 -32.67 -6.15 5.57 17.00 61.67
% of total 19.7 %
Above 10 y 14 14 36.89 9.27 34.67 -6.39 11.09 27.57 64.81 111.64
% of total 19.7 %
Fund Age
Sample 
Size
Internal Rate of Return (In Percent)
Funds with 
IRR data
The table shows fund performance measured by the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), net of fees and carried interest, sorted by age. 
IRRs are calculated in the same manner as in table 4. Fund Age is calculated from the first to last reported cash flow, and is 
subsequently rounded. Subdivisons by Age are based on an age variable that is not rounded. The pattern of Mean IRR's is 
consistent with the J-curve, showing negative IRRs of young funds and increasing IRRs with age.
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Table 6. Cumulative Contributions and Distributions by Fund Age
Cumulative 
Contributions / 
Committed Capital
Cumulative 
Distributions / 
Committed Capital
0 2 2 0.10 0.00
1 4 4 0.26 0.00
2 8 8 0.46 0.04
3 9 8 0.69 0.56
4 6 6 0.93 0.12
5 5 5 0.79 1.43
6 6 5 0.98 1.68
7 8 7 0.66 1.10
8 3 3 0.91 0.98
9 6 5 0.86 0.62
10 7 5 1.20 1.81
11 1 0 - -
12 1 0 - -
13 1 1 1.12 4.15
14 2 0 - -
16 1 0 - -
17 1 1 0.79 4.85
Total 71 60 0.74 0.88
% 100 % 84.5 %
Funds with 
Contr./Distr./
CC DataFund Age Sample Size
The table shows cumulative contributions and distributions in relation to committed 
capital. The general partner calls on predetermined capital committed by the limited 
partners as portfolio investments are made. The youngest funds are far from being 
fully invested, but cumulative contributions approach committed capital at four years 
of age. Distributions from the liquidation of portfolio investments start to appear after 
the funds have existed for a few years. A major increase in distributions is apparent in 
funds older than 4.5 years (Fund Age is rounded) . There are 10 funds for which we 
cannot calculate Contributions/Distributions and one fund for which we did not find 
committed apital.
Mean
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Table 7. Cumulative Distributions by Age and Sequence Number
N/A S = 1 S= 2 S = 3 S = 4 S > 4 S = 1 & 2 S > 2
0 2 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 4 4 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 8 8 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.05
3 9 8 3.97 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.08
4 6 6 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.58 0.03 0.21
5 5 5 0.96 0.43 0.91 2.42 0.70 1.92
6 6 5 3.78 0.34 0.25 3.78 0.28
7 8 7 1.47 0.62 1.06 1.81 0.91 1.25
8 3 3 0.56 2.09 0.29 1.33 0.29
9 6 5 0.52 0.76 0.69 0.61 0.60 0.65
10 7 5 2.72 0.73 2.45 - 1.39 2.45
11 1 0 -
12 1 0 -
13 1 1 4.15 4.15
14 2 0 - -
16 1 0 -
17 1 1 4.85 4.85
Total 71 60 3.97 2.13 0.69 0.81 0.80 0.18 1.23 0.56
% 100 % 84.5 % N 1 9 15 12 9 14 24 35
The table shows distributions in relation to committed capital, broken down by age and sequence. Fund Age is a rounded variable. 
First and second sequence funds are grouped to show differences against later sequence funds. There is no obvious difference 
between early and higher sequence funds in distributions of capital. 
Mean Cumulative Distributions / Commited Capital by Sequence No.
Fund Age
Sample 
Size
Funds 
with 
Contr./ 
Distr./CC. 
Data
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Table 9 
 
  
Table 8. IRR by Age and Sequence Number
N/A S = 1 S= 2 S = 3 S = 4 S > 4 S = 1 & 2 S > 2
0 2 2 -44.20 -93.17 -15.36 -54.30
1 4 4 1.21 -63.47 -53.80
2 8 8 37.30 -23.27 78.10 -14.30 37.30 7.30
3 9 9 185.76 -0.03 31.52 6.10 1.20 -0.03 -1.27
4 6 6 4.63 46.69 -12.08 23.41 4.63 14.30
5 5 5 46.62 55.87 32.70 61.06 51.24 56.27
6 6 6 47.80 -1.22 6.76 47.80 4.77
7 8 8 65.40 0.16 32.70 22.23 32.80 30.10
8 3 3 -32.67 12.65 -9.22 -10.00 -9.22
9 6 6 -8.80 -5.71 -1.71 3.90 -7.76 2.03
10 7 7 20.71 5.99 12.20 8.60 13.35 11.00
11 1 1 111.64 111.64
12 1 1 63.09 63.09
13 1 1 83.32 83.32
14 2 2 31.03 55.79 43.40
16 1 1 15.36 15.36
17 1 1 69.98 69.98
Total 71 71 185.76 29.28 20.00 11.70 22.60 -8.72 24.02 6.51
% 100 % 100.0 % N 1 13 17 13 11 16 30 40
The table shows mean fund IRRs, broken down by age and sequence. Fund Age is a rounded variable. First and second sequence 
funds are grouped to show differences against later sequence funds. The apparent trend of decreasing IRRs with increases in 
vintage is an implication of the J-curve pattern and that the early sequence funds are older. There is no easily detectable difference 
in performance between early and higher sequence funds, when comparing IRRs of same age funds. 
Fund Age 
Sample 
Size
Funds with 
IRR Data
Mean IRR by Sequence No. (In Percent)
Table 9. Performance by Stage
Sample Size: 71
Age
No. No. No. No. No.
0-2 3 -55.69 3 -13.30 4 24.30 1 78.10 9 2.80
3-5 5 9.70 2 18.60 2 27.60 - - 6 32.49
6-8 6 13.00 3 25.50 2 -10.00 1 15.26 5 30.70
Above 9 3 7.30 4 4.52 1 -6.39 5 50.90 6 37.60
All funds 17 -1.1 12 9.4 9 14.0 7 49.7 26 23.0
% of total 21.1 % 19.7 % 12.7 % 9.9 % 36.6 %
Mean IRR (In Percent) by Stage
The table shows mean fund IRRs broken down by investment stage, and sorted by age groups (based on an 
age variable that is not rounded). Funds classified as Generalist and Buyouts display higher IRRs than funds 
classified as investing in other stages.
Early Stage Later Stage Balanced Stage Generalist Buyouts
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Table 10. Performance by Committed Capital
Sample Size: 71
0<CC<50 50<CC<150 150<CC<500 500<CC
Mean 25.4 15.2 10.2 7.6
StDev 46.2 53.2 36.1 29.3
Median 11.8 3.8 8.2 15.7
No. Funds 22 27 12 10
% of total 31.0 % 38.0 % 16.9 % 14.1 %
IRR (in percent) by Committed Capital
The table shows IRRs of funds of different size. They are grouped according to 
committed capital (CC) in MEUR.
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Table 11a. Rank Correlation Based on Different Performance Measures
Sample Size: 71
Measure IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM 
Excess IRR
ICM 
Excess 
MIRR
IRR 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.74 0.83 0.64 0.79
TVPI 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.79 0.85 0.60 0.77
MIRR 0% 0.97 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.73 0.81 0.65 0.80
MIRR 8% 0.97 0.92 0.99 1.00 0.73 0.82 0.64 0.80
MIRR 12% 0.97 0.92 0.99 1.00 0.73 0.82 0.64 0.80
PI L&R 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.90 0.71 0.83
PME K&S 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.91
ICM Excess IRR 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.71 0.82 0.93
ICM Excess MIRR 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.91 0.93
Mean 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.77 0.85 0.70 0.83
MSCI Nordic 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.44 -0.15 0.05 -0.15 0.06
Table 11b. Rank Correlation Based on Different Performance Measures
Sample Size: 44
Measure IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM 
Excess IRR
ICM 
Excess 
MIRR
IRR 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.88 0.91 0.81 0.93
TVPI 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.76 0.91
MIRR 0% 0.93 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.94
MIRR 8% 0.94 0.92 0.99 1.00 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.94
MIRR 12% 0.95 0.92 0.98 1.00 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.94
PI L&R 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.78 0.90
PME K&S 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.84 0.95
ICM Excess IRR 0.81 0.76 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.84 0.90
ICM Excess MIRR 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.95 0.90
Mean 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.93
MSCI Nordic 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.11 -0.30 -0.13 -0.26 -0.09
The table presents Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between different performance measures. MIRR is applied using 
three different investment-/reinvestment rates: 0%, 8 % and 12 %. PI, PME, ICM Excess IRR and ICM Excess MIRR are calculated 
using the same period return on the MSCI Nordic Index. Point estimates replace 10 missing observations of TVPI. The point 
estimates are found by running a regression with TVPI as dependent variable and a new multiple, calculated as the sum of all net 
positive cash flows divided by the sum of all net negative cash flows, as the independent variable. In the cases that do not 
contain missing values, 99,6 per cent of the variation in TVPI is explained by the independent variable. ICM Excess IRR cannot be 
computed for 8 funds. The table also shows the rank correlation coefficients against the ranked return on the MSCI Nordic 
during the fund life.
Several of the performance measures are not suited to analyze young funds. Distributions are small during the early years of a 
fund's life and stale valuation may affect NAV. Looking at funds with a short life may also cause the market related measures to 
produce results that are of little value when considering fund performance. To correct for this, we have excluded funds that are 
younger than four years. The cutoff value of four years, reduces the sample to 44 funds. The table presents Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficients between different performance metrics, for the reduced sample. Point estimates replace 9 missing 
observations of TVPI. ICM Excess IRR cannot be computed for 7 funds.
Rank Correlation Matrix
Rank Correlation Matrix
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Table 12a. Rank Correlation Based on Different Performance Measures
Sample Size: 71
Measure
Limit l u l u l u l u l u l u l u l u
IRR -0.30 0.30 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.56 0.85 0.71 0.91 0.41 0.79
TVPI 0.89 0.97 -0.30 0.30 0.87 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.87 0.96 0.59 0.86 0.74 0.92 0.49 0.82
MIRR 0% 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.96 -0.30 0.30 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.55 0.85 0.68 0.90 0.43 0.80
MIRR 8% 0.95 0.99 0.88 0.96 0.99 1.00 -0.30 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.85 0.69 0.90 0.42 0.79
MIRR 12% 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 -0.30 0.30 0.54 0.84 0.70 0.90 0.41 0.79
PI L&R 0.56 0.85 0.59 0.86 0.55 0.85 0.55 0.85 0.54 0.84 -0.30 0.30 0.83 0.95 0.51 0.83
PME K&S 0.71 0.91 0.74 0.92 0.68 0.90 0.69 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.83 0.95 -0.30 0.30 0.69 0.90
ICM Excess IRR 0.41 0.79 0.49 0.82 0.43 0.80 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.79 0.51 0.83 0.69 0.90 -0.30 0.30
ICM Excess MIRR 0.64 0.88 0.67 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.70 0.90 0.84 0.95 0.88 0.96
Table 12b. Rank Correlation Based on Different Performance Measures
Sample Size: 44
Measure
Limit l u l u l u l u l u l u l u l u
IRR -0.30 0.30 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.56 0.85 0.71 0.91 0.41 0.79
TVPI 0.89 0.97 -0.30 0.30 0.87 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.87 0.97 0.59 0.86 0.74 0.92 0.49 0.82
MIRR 0% 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.96 -0.30 0.30 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.55 0.85 0.68 0.90 0.43 0.80
MIRR 8% 0.95 0.99 0.88 0.96 0.99 1.00 -0.30 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.85 0.69 0.90 0.42 0.79
MIRR 12% 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 -0.30 0.30 0.54 0.84 0.70 0.90 0.41 0.79
PI L&R 0.56 0.85 0.59 0.86 0.55 0.85 0.55 0.85 0.54 0.92 -0.30 0.30 0.83 0.95 0.51 0.83
PME K&S 0.71 0.91 0.74 0.92 0.68 0.90 0.69 0.90 0.70 0.93 0.83 0.95 -0.30 0.30 0.69 0.90
ICM Excess IRR 0.41 0.79 0.49 0.82 0.43 0.80 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.89 0.51 0.83 0.69 0.90 -0.30 0.30
ICM Excess MIRR 0.64 0.88 0.67 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.66 0.97 0.70 0.90 0.84 0.95 0.88 0.96
The table presents 99 percent confidence intervals of the Spearman rank correlation coefficients in Table 11a, found using Fisher's 
z transformation. The transformation converts Spearman rank correlations to the normally distributed variable z, which is used to 
determine the confidence intervals. These intervals have been converted back to Spearman rhos. The full sample of 71 funds is 
used. The confidence interval for ICM Excess IRR is determined using 63 funds, as the measure cannot be computed for 8 funds. 
Lower and upper limits of the confidence intervals are denoted l and u, respectively. 
IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S
ICM Excess 
IRR
The table presents 99 percent confidence intervals of the Spearman rank correlations for the reduced sample, consisting of funds 
older than four years. The confidence intervals are found using Fisher's z transformation. The confidence interval for ICM Excess 
IRR is determined using 37 funds, as the measure cannot be computed for 7 funds.
Confidence Intervals
ICM Excess 
IRRPME K&S
Confidence Intervals
IRR PI L&RMIRR 12%MIRR 8%MIRR 0%TVPI
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Table 13a. Correlation Between Different Performance Measures
Sample Size: 71. 
Measure IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
IRR
ICM Excess 
MIRR
IRR 0.64 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.61 0.53 0.66 0.85
TVPI 0.64 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.91 0.90 0.23 0.50
MIRR 0% 0.88 0.49 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.38 0.60 0.83
MIRR 8% 0.89 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.39 0.60 0.83
MIRR 12% 0.90 0.51 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.83
PI L&R 0.61 0.91 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.37 0.58
PME K&S 0.53 0.90 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.83 0.61 0.50
ICM Excess IRR 0.66 0.23 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.37 0.61 0.90
ICM Excess MIRR 0.85 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.58 0.50 0.90
Mean 0.75 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.73
MSCI Nordic 0.58 0.26 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.05 0.10 -0.03 0.26
Table 13b. Correlation Between Different Performance Measures
Sample Size: 44. 
Measure IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
IRR
ICM Excess 
MIRR
IRR 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.80 0.69 0.73 0.89
TVPI 0.82 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.93 0.92 0.49 0.75
MIRR 0% 0.85 0.71 0.99 0.98 0.79 0.55 0.71 0.93
MIRR 8% 0.88 0.73 0.99 1.00 0.80 0.57 0.69 0.93
MIRR 12% 0.89 0.73 0.98 1.00 0.80 0.57 0.67 0.93
PI L&R 0.80 0.93 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.46 0.80
PME K&S 0.69 0.92 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.82 0.63 0.66
ICM Excess IRR 0.73 0.49 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.46 0.63 0.82
ICM Excess MIRR 0.89 0.75 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.80 0.66 0.82
Mean 0.82 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.84
MSCI Nordic 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.23 -0.03 -0.26 -0.11
Correlation Matrix
Correlation Matrix
The table presents correlation coefficients between different performance measures. MIRR is applied using three different 
investment-/reinvestment rates: 0%, 8 % and 12 %. PI, PME, ICM Excess IRR and ICM Excess MIRR are calculated using the same 
period return on the MSCI Nordic Index. TVPI cannot be computed for 10 funds, but these missing values are replaced by point 
estimates of TVPI (ref. Table 11a). ICM Excess IRR cannot be computed for 8 funds. The table also shows the correlation 
coefficients against the return on the MSCI Nordic during the fund life.
The table presents correlation coefficients between the performance metrics for the reduced sample of 44 funds, consisting of 
funds older than four years. Point estimates replace 9 missing observations of TVPI. ICM Excess IRR cannot be computed for 7 
funds.
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Table 14a. Ranked Fund Performance
Sample Size: 71
IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
IRR
ICM Excess 
MIRR Age
1 9 2 2 2 16 10 - 2 2.9
2 29 1 1 1 6 5 1 1 1.9
3 1* 5 5 5 1 1 - 3 10.8
4 7 21 19 18 19 8 - 20 12.6
5 4 6 6 6 3 2 18 6 6.6
6 22 4 4 4 40 26 3 8 2.2
7 2 3 3 3 2 3 28 5 6.1
8 3 20 17 16 4 4 - 14 17.0
9 10 12 12 10 9 6 - 7 6.6
10 8 7 7 7 7 9 19 10 5.0
11 5* 17 15 15 8 17 37 29 12.0
12 15* 15 14 14 5 11 22 22 7.0
13 12 11 9 8 12 16 5 12 5.3
14 6* 22 21 20 10 15 36 26 14.3
15 13 9 8 9 18 25 24 21 5.0
16 18 10 11 11 14 23 13 13 5.3
17 14 13 13 13 38 21 9 15 4.8
18 17 8 10 12 17 14 12 11 4.1
Table 14b. Ranked Fund Performance
Sample Size: 44
IRR TVPI MIRR 0% MIRR 8% MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
IRR
ICM Excess 
MIRR Age
1 1* 2 2 2 1 1 - 1 10.8
2 7 16 15 14 17 7 - 12 12.6
3 4 3 3 3 3 2 6 3 6.6
4 2 1 1 1 2 3 14 2 6.1
5 3 15 13 13 4 4 - 9 17.0
6 9 9 9 7 8 5 - 4 6.6
7 8 4 4 4 6 8 7 5 5.0
8 5* 13 12 12 7 14 22 17 12.0
9 14* 11 11 11 5 9 9 14 7.0
10 11 8 6 5 11 13 1 7 5.3
11 6* 17 16 16 9 12 21 15 14.3
12 12 6 5 6 16 21 10 13 5.0
13 17 7 8 8 13 19 5 8 5.3
14 13 10 10 10 27 17 2 10 4.8
15 16 5 7 9 15 11 4 6 4.1
16 25 30 25 23 31 25 16 25 14.0
17 15 19 18 17 22 6 - 11 9.9
18 18* 12 14 15 19 24 12 19 6.3
The table shows the 18 top performing funds (top quartile) according to the IRR measure, and the rank these funds acheive by 
other measures. TVPI cannot be computed for 10 funds (*). Point estimates replace the missing values (ref Table 11a). ICM Excess 
IRR cannot be computed for 8 funds (-).
Individual Fund Performance Ranked by Perfomance Metrics
Individual Fund Performance Ranked by Perfomance Metrics
Several of the performance measures are not suited to analyze young funds. Distributions are small during the early years of a 
fund's life and stale valuation may affect NAV. Looking at funds with a short life may also cause the market related measures to 
produce results that are of little value when considering fund performance. To correct for this, we have excluded funds that are 
younger than four years. The cutoff value of four years reduces the sample to 44 funds. Among these, there are 9 funds where 
TVPI is estimated (*) and 7 funds for which we cannot compute ICM Excess IRR (-). The 18 funds that are presented below 
correspond to just over 40 per cent of funds in the new sample.   
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Table 15. Differences in Rank across Quartiles
Sample Size: 44
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
Top Quartile 2.55 1.81 4.18 3.60 1.82 1.99 2.64 4.25 3.73 3.26
3. Quartile 3.27 3.23 4.27 2.87 6.45 3.86 6.45 5.80 5.18 3.84
2. Quartile 2.55 4.32 0.64 0.81 5.09 3.11 4.91 3.86 3.36 2.11
Bottom Quartile 1.27 1.27 3.09 2.98 3.00 2.61 3.82 3.82 2.64 1.80
ICM Excess MIRR
The table shows the absolute difference in ranking towards IRR. It is expressed by their mean differences and standard deviations, 
by quartiles, when ranked by IRR. The sample of funds are those above four years. The performance measures are generally more 
consistent in ranking funds that are in the top and bottom quartile, compared to those in the middle. 
Difference against IRR
TVPI MIRR 8% PI L&R PME K&S 
Table 16. Overlap in Top Quartile Rank
Sample Size: 71
Measure
No Perc No Perc No Perc No Perc No Perc No Perc No Perc
IRR 0 0.30 0.97 0.99 18 25.4
MIRR 12% 17 94.4 19 26.8
MIRR 8% 16 88.9 17 94.4 20 28.2
MIRR 0% 15 83.3 16 88.9 17 94.4 21 29.6
TVPI 16 88.9 15 83.3 14 77.8 13 72.2 23 32.4
PME K&S 14 77.8 14 77.8 13 72.2 12 66.7 14 77.8 25 35.2
PI L&R 15 83.3 14 77.8 14 77.8 13 72.2 14 77.8 15 83.3 26 36.6
ICM Excess MIRR 13 72.2 14 77.8 14 77.8 13 72.2 12 66.7 12 66.7 11 61.1 29 40.8
Overlap in Top Quartile Rank
The table presents the number and percentage of funds that overlap funds defined as top quartile according to other 
performance measures. The total sample of 71 funds is used, and 18 funds are defined as top quartile by each measure. ICM 
Excess IRR is not shown, as eight funds do not have defined values. The order in which the measures are listed deviates from the 
other tables, in order to show additions to funds defined "top quartile in at least one measure". 30 funds are defined as top 
quartile by at least one measure. The figure for TVPI in this column represents the total of funds defined as top quartile by either 
IRR, MIRR 12%, MIRR 8 %, MIRR 0% or TVPI, and not the number of funds defined as top quartile by only IRR or TVPI (which would 
be 18 +2 = 20).
Top 
Quatile in 
at least 
One 
Measure
Of Total 
Sample 
(In 
Percent)
IRR MIRR 12% MIRR 8% MIRR 0% TVPI PME K&S PI L&R
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Table 17a. Consistency Ratio: Consistency in Relative Performance between Measures
Sample Size: 68. Unchanged: 54.
Measure IRR TVPI MIRR 8% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
MIRR
IRR 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.91
TVPI 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.91
MIRR 8% 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.88
PI L&R 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.93
PME K&S 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.96 0.94
ICM Excess MIRR 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.94
Mean 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91
Table 17b. Consistency Ratio: Consistency in Relative Performance between Measures
Sample Size: 42. Unchanged: 35.
Measure IRR TVPI MIRR 8% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
MIRR
IRR 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.95
TVPI 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
MIRR 8% 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.90
PI L&R 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95
PME K&S 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.95
ICM Excess MIRR 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.95
Mean 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.94
The table displays the consistency in which the performance measures describe a fund’s 
performance relative to the performance of its vintage. What we denote Consistency Ratio, is the 
ratio in which two different measures at the same time determine that a fund has performed 
either better or worse than their corresponding vintage medians. A ratio of 1 indicates full 
agreement between two measures. Vintages with only one fund are left out of the analysis, and 
the sample size is reduced to 68 funds. ICM Excess IRR is not displayed because it cannot be 
calculated for several funds. 54 out of 68 funds are evaluated consistently across all measures.
Consitency Ratio towards Median Vintage Performance
Consitency Ratio towards Median Vintage Performance
The table shows Consitency Ratios for funds older than four years. The sample size consists of 42 
funds, after removing funds that are the only one in its vintage. 
Total Consitency Ratio: 0.83
Total Consitency Ratio: 0.79
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Table 18. Reinvestment Assumption: Distributions Reinvested at IRR
Sample Size: 71
Age Mean Min. Median Max.
0 2 -54.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 4 -53.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 8 18.50 0.03 -0.13 0.00 0.38
3 9 19.80 0.73 -0.02 0.00 6.05
4 6 9.45 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.14
5 5 54.26 2.57 0.07 0.86 7.48
6 6 19.10 3.01 -0.02 0.04 17.74
7 8 31.40 3.69 0.00 0.67 9.97
8 3 -9.70 -0.11 -0.69 -0.08 0.45
9 6 -2.86 0.14 -0.22 -0.04 0.78
10 7 12.33 1.12 -0.08 0.92 3.83
11 1 111.64 414.82 414.82 414.82 414.82
12 1 63.09 178.54 178.54 178.54 178.54
13 1 83.32 464.87 464.87 464.87 464.87
14 2 43.40 134.00 16.00 134.00 253.00
16 1 15.36 6.59 6.59 6.59 6.59
17 1 69.98 3238.40 3238.40 3238.40 3238.40
Distributions can rarely be expected to be reinvested at the IRR rate, causing the effective 
return to deviate from the observed IRR. Testing the consequence of falsely assuming that 
distributions can be invested at the IRR, we list the resulting change in TVPI following this 
added assumption. The mean, median, minimum and maximum change from observed 
TVPIs are listed below, together with the mean IRR. The full sample of 71 funds are listed 
and sorted according to age. Missing values of TVPI are replaced by point estimates (ref 
Table 11a)
Absolute Change in TVPI
Mean IRR 
(In Percent)
Funds with 
IRR/TVPI 
Data
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Table 19. Reinvestment Assumption, Spread between Top/Bottom Quartile Funds
Sample Size: 71
Measure Mean StDev Min. 
First 
quartile Median
Third 
quartile Max.
3. -1. 
quartile
IRR 16.43 45.29 -93.17 -7.42 8.60 31.52 185.76 38.94
TVPI 1.92 1.93 0.22 0.87 1.41 2.43 13.43 1.56
MIRR 0% 3.34 20.91 -93.17 -3.23 4.83 12.82 51.98 16.05
MIRR 8% 7.57 22.01 -93.17 0.74 8.36 17.93 58.38 17.19
MIRR 12% 9.63 22.57 -93.17 2.07 9.95 19.90 61.46 17.83
PI 0.50 1.30 -0.84 -0.20 0.19 0.77 6.67 0.97
PME 1.52 1.61 0.22 0.93 1.23 1.64 13.56 0.72
ICM Excess IRR 5.96 27.28 -47.65 -8.62 2.10 18.05 158.31 26.67
ICM Excess MIRR 4.51 14.06 -31.79 -3.10 4.42 10.57 57.90 13.67
MICM 4.74 14.39 -31.79 -2.64 4.60 10.66 67.93 13.30
Values
The table shows the mean performance of all funds in the sample, by different measures. Fund returns appear significantly less 
dispersed using the MIRR compared to IRR. The spread between top and bottom quartile funds is 38.94 using IRR, and 17.83 
percentage points using MIRR_12%. Point estimates replace 10 missing observations of TVPI (ref Table 11a). ICM Excess IRR cannot 
be computed for 8 funds. Values are in percent, except for TVPI, PI and PME.
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Table 20. Multiples: Comparing TVPI to PI
Sample Size: 71
Rank TVPI TVPI PI 15/15  PI L&R Age
1 13.43              6.73                6.67                11                    
2 8.11                3.85                6.20                6                      
3 6.11                2.73                2.51                17                    
4 4.88                2.45                3.86                7                      
5 4.20                1.75                1.54                12                    
- - - - -
20 2.16                0.18                0.49                6                      
21 2.13                0.10                1.00                10                    
22 2.01                0.58                0.01                2                      
23 1.99                0.30                1.02                10                    
24 1.92                -0.10               -0.21               8                      
25 1.92                -0.29               -0.06               10                    
26 1.91                0.01                0.47                9                     
27 1.88                0.29                -0.13              14                   
28 1.81                0.20                0.86                7                     
29 1.81                0.94                1.87                2                     
30 1.69                -0.12               -0.02               10                    
31 1.62                -0.12               0.69                7                      
32 1.55                0.15                -0.27              4                     
33 1.48                -0.27               0.38                7                      
34 1.44                0.15                0.60                3                     
35 1.41                -0.25               -0.27               9                      
36 1.41                0.18                0.36                3                     
37 1.27                -0.48               -0.12               7                      
38 1.17                0.04                0.20                2                     
The table shows funds ranked according to the TVPI multiple. The fund 
ranked as no. 23 (in bold) is the lowest ranking fund that has a positive PI, 
and from which all funds above it have positive PIs, assuming a hurdle rate 
of 15 percent. Its age is 10 and the TVPI for this fund is 1.99. Eight funds 
below it (in bold italic) have positive PIs. 
Top Ten Funds by IRR
67 
 
Table 21 
 
  
Table 21. Sensistivity Analysis: Effect of Additional Early and Late Distributions
Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late
0.00 0.00 0.31 0.31 2.48 2.48 0.18 0.18 0.41 0.41 2.46 2.46 - - 0.11 0.11
0.11 0.05 0.34 0.31 2.55 2.55 0.19 0.18 0.47 0.44 2.51 2.50 - - 0.11 0.11
0.23 0.10 0.37 0.32 2.63 2.63 0.19 0.19 0.53 0.47 2.56 2.54 - - 0.11 0.11
0.51 0.23 0.45 0.32 2.81 2.81 0.20 0.19 0.69 0.54 2.69 2.64 - - 0.12 0.11
0.74 0.34 0.54 0.33 2.95 2.95 0.21 0.20 0.81 0.60 2.79 2.72 - - 0.12 0.12
0.91 0.41 0.60 0.34 3.06 3.06 0.22 0.20 0.90 0.64 2.87 2.78 - - 0.13 0.12
96 % 10 % 23 % 23 % 20 % 10 % 120 % 56 % 17 % 13 % - - 19 % 15 %
0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 2.13 2.13 0.15 0.15 1.00 1.00 1.64 1.64 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
0.11 0.05 0.19 0.18 2.22 2.22 0.15 0.15 1.10 1.08 1.74 1.75 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
0.23 0.10 0.21 0.18 2.32 2.32 0.16 0.15 1.21 1.16 1.85 1.86 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
0.51 0.23 0.28 0.20 2.55 2.55 0.18 0.16 1.47 1.37 2.10 2.12 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05
0.74 0.33 0.34 0.21 2.73 2.73 0.19 0.17 1.69 1.54 2.31 2.34 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06
0.91 0.41 0.40 0.21 2.87 2.87 0.20 0.17 1.84 1.66 2.46 2.50 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07
135 % 26 % 35 % 35 % 38 % 19 % 85 % 67 % 50 % 52 % 26 % 90 % 100 % 101 %
ICM Excess 
MIRR
Additional Distribution
The table displays the result of a sensitivity analysis conducted on two PE funds. Both are 1998 vintage, and have IRRs of 17 
percent (Fund B) and 31 percent (Fund A), which roughly corresponds to the full sample mean and third quartile. Observed 
performance is listed at the top of the table, indicated by zero additional distribution. Hypothetical cash flows, which constitute 
from 11 to 91 per cent of committed capital, are added to show the effect on the performance measures, when these appear 3 
and 10 years after inception of the fund. In order to relate the late distribution to the early distribution, the late distribution is 
discounted back to year three, assuming a cost of capital of 12 percent (denoted Late Distr. NPV/ CC). A distribution that amounts 
to 51 percent of committed capital in year 10 has a NPV equal to 23 percent of committed capital paid out in year three. 
Percentage increases in the performance measures, following the maximum distributions, are listed for both funds.
Fund A
Incr. Following Max. Distr.:
Incr. Following Max. Distr.:
Late Distr. 
NPV/ CCDistr/ CC
Fund B
Values Following Additional Early/Late Distribution 
IRR TVPI MIRR 12% PI L&R PME K&S 
ICM Excess 
IRR
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Table 22 
 
  
Table 22. Sensitivity to Late Distributions (1 % of Committed Capital)
Sample Size: 18
Measure
Funds with 
Perf. Data Mean Min. 
Lower 
quartile Median
Upper 
quartile Max.
IRR 18 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0012 0.0026
TVPI 11 0.0128 0.0063 0.0089 0.0110 0.0191 0.0204
MIRR 0% 18 0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0008 0.0017
MIRR 8% 18 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0016
MIRR 12% 18 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0016
Total PI 18 0.0081 0.0006 0.0019 0.0069 0.0116 0.0277
PI 15% 18 0.0054 0.0009 0.0019 0.0035 0.0067 0.0244
PME 18 0.0084 0.0010 0.0025 0.0066 0.0101 0.0448
ICM Excess IRR 11 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0008 0.0026
ICM Excess MIRR 18 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 0.0017
Measure
Funds with 
Perf. Data Mean Min. 
Lower 
quartile Median
Upper 
quartile Max.
IRR 18 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.59 2.26
TVPI 11 0.53 0.21 0.25 0.48 0.68 1.18
MIRR 0% 18 0.64 0.12 0.21 0.37 0.79 2.49
MIRR 8% 18 0.35 0.03 0.09 0.22 0.49 1.60
MIRR 12% 18 0.28 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.39 1.35
Total PI 18 2.46 0.07 0.38 0.61 1.12 30.71
PI 15% 18 4.74 0.06 0.30 0.66 3.43 56.58
PME 18 0.35 0.04 0.12 0.33 0.51 1.10
ICM Excess IRR 11 4.42 0.24 0.41 0.60 1.18 33.12
ICM Excess MIRR 18 2.94 0.03 0.17 0.53 1.26 33.06
Change (In Percent)
Absolute Change 
The table shows the absolute and percentage change in the performance measures following an additional distribution equal to 1 
percent of committed capital at the time of reporting. The sample of funds is restricted to those older than seven years when 
rounded, having IRRs above 10 percent.
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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List of Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Active Fund An Active Fund is one that is not Liquidated.   
Average (Mean) 
IRR 
The arithmetic mean of the internal rates of return (IRRs). EVCA 
Glossary 
Balanced Stage 
Fund 
This stage describes funds that make investments into 
portfolio companies in a variety of stages of development -
Seed, Startup, Early Stage and Later Stage. 
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Beta A statistical measure of a security’s volatility, compared to 
the overall market. A beta of less than 1 indicates lower 
volatility than the general market; a beta of 1 or more 
indicates higher volatility than the general market. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Buyouts This stage describes funds that make a leveraged buyout, 
management buyout or acquisition investments. These funds 
use debt in addition to equity to leverage the size of their 
investments and increase the potential return on investment. 
This stage would also include funds making infrastructure 
investments. 
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Carried Interest 
 
A share of the profit accruing to an investment fund 
management company or individual members of the fund 
management team, as a compensation for the own capital 
invested and their risk taken. Carried interest (typically up to 
20 percent of the profits of the fund) becomes payable once 
the limited partners have achieved repayment of their 
original investment in the fund plus a defined hurdle rate. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Commitment A limited partner’s obligation to provide a certain amount of 
capital to a private equity fund when the general partner asks 
for capital. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Contributions to 
Commited 
Capital 
The sum of all Contributions as a portion of Committed 
Capital.  
 
  
71 
 
Delisting The removal of a company from listing on an exchange. EVCA 
Glossary 
Development 
Stage Funds 
Development funds make investments into portfolio 
companies whose primary objective is to increase 
investments, employment, and revenue to a regional 
geographic area.  
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Distribution The amount disbursed to the limited partners in a private 
equity fund. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Contributions/ 
Drawdowns 
When investors commit themselves to back a private equity 
fund, all the funding may not be needed at once. Some is 
used and some is drawn down later. The amount that is 
drawn down is defined as contributed capital. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Early Stage 
Fund 
A Fund with an investment strategy involving investments in 
companies for product development and initial marketing, 
manufacturing and sales activities. 
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Expansion 
Stage Fund 
This stage can be used by funds that are managed by both 
buyout firms and venture capital firms. For venture capital 
firms, Expansion stage funds invest into portfolio companies 
that have products and services that are currently available, 
and require additional capital to expand production to 
increase revenue. For buyout firms, Expansion stage funds 
are sometimes referred to as growth or growth equity funds. 
In this case funds typically only invest in portfolio 
companies using equity usually to expand operations on a 
national or international stage, possibly through acquisitions 
of smaller or similarly sized companies, or increased 
production.  
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Fund Age The age of a fund (in years) from the date of the first 
reported cash flow to liquidation or date of reporting.  
 
Fund Size The total amount of capital committed by the limited and 
general partners of a fund. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Fund Status A fund may be either Active or Liquidated.  
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General Partner 
(GP) 
A partner in a private equity management company who has 
unlimited personal liability for the debts and obligations of 
the limited partnership and the right to participate in its 
management. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Generalist This stage describes funds that make an equal amount of 
venture capital and buyout investing. 
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Hedge Fund An investment vehicle, where managers invest in a variety of 
markets and securities, to achieve the highest absolute 
return. Investments could be either made in financial 
markets, using stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies and 
derivatives, or by using advanced investment techniques 
such as shorting, leveraging, swaps and using arbitrage. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Hurdle Rate A return ceiling that a private equity fund management 
company needs to return to the fund’s investors in addition 
to the repayment of their initial commitment, before fund 
managers become entitled to carried interest payments from 
the fund. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Inception The starting point of calculations for a fund; the vintage year 
or date of first capital drawdown. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Index A benchmark against which financial or economic 
performance is measured, (e.g. S&P 500, FTSE 100). 
EVCA 
Glossary 
J-curve The curve generated by plotting the returns generated by a 
private equity fund against time (from inception to 
termination). The common practice of paying the 
management fee and start-up costs out of the first 
contributions does not produce an equivalent book value. As 
a result, a private equity fund will initially show a negative 
return. When the first realizations are made, the fund returns 
start to rise quite steeply. After about three to five years the 
interim IRR will give a reasonable indication of the 
definitive IRR. This period is generally shorter for buyout 
funds than for early stage and expansion funds. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
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Later Stage 
Funds 
This stage describes funds that make investments into 
portfolio companies that have an already established product 
or service that has already generated revenue, but may not be 
making a profit. Later stage funds make the last round of 
investments in portfolio companies before an exit in the 
form of an IPO or acquisition by a strategic partner. 
VentureXpert 
Glossary 
Limited Partner An investor in a limited partnership (i.e. private equity fund). EVCA 
Glossary 
Limited 
Partnership 
The legal structure used by most venture and private equity 
funds. The partnership is usually a fixed-life investment 
vehicle, and consists of a general partner (the management 
firm, which has unlimited liability) and limited partners (the 
investors, who have limited liability and are not involved 
with the day-to-day operations). The general partner receives 
a management fee and a percentage of the profits. The 
limited partners receive income, capital gains, and tax 
benefits. The general partner (management firm) manages 
the partnership using policy laid down in a Partnership 
Agreement. The agreement also covers, terms, fees, 
structures and other items agreed between the limited 
partners and the general partner. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Liquidated 
Fund 
We define a fund as Liquidated either when reported 
Liquidated by the GP or when it is above 10 years of age 
and its residual value constitutes less than 10 percent of 
committed capital. 
 
Management 
Fees 
Fee received by a private equity fund management company 
from its limited partners, to cover the fund’s overhead costs, 
allowing for the proper management of the company. This 
annual management charge is equal to a certain percentage 
of the investors’ commitments to the fund. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Median IRR The Value appearing halfway in a table ranking funds by 
IRR in descending order. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
  
74 
 
Net Asset 
Value/ Residual 
Value 
The estimated value of the assets of the fund, net of fees and 
carried interest. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Paid-In Capital The amount of committed capital an investor has actually 
transferred to a fund. Also known as the cumulative 
takedown amount. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Pooled IRR The IRR obtained by taking cash flows from inception 
together with the Residual Value for each fund and 
aggregating them into a pool as if they were a single fund. 
This is superior to either the average, which can be skewed 
by large returns on relatively small investments, or the 
capital weighted IRR which weights each IRR by capital 
committed. This latter measure would be accurate only if all 
investments were made at once at the beginning of the funds 
life. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Portfolio 
company  
The company or entity into which a private equity fund 
invests directly. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Private Equity Private equity provides equity capital to enterprises not 
quoted on a stock market. Private equity can be used to 
develop new products and technologies (also called venture 
capital), to expand working capital, to make acquisitions, or 
to strengthen a company’s balance sheet. It can also resolve 
ownership and management issues. A succession in family-
owned companies, or the buyout and buyin of a business by 
experienced managers may be achieved by using private 
equity funding. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Private Equity 
Fund 
A private equity investment fund is a vehicle for enabling 
pooled investment by a number of investors in equity and 
equity-related securities of companies. These are generally 
private companies whose shares are not quoted on a stock 
exchange. The fund can take the form of either a company or 
an unincorporated arrangement such as a Limited 
Partnership. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
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Prospectus A document which must be delivered to recipients of offers 
to sell securities and to purchasers of securities in a public 
offering and which contains a detailed description of the 
issuer’s business. In the USA, it is included as part of the 
registration statement filed with the SEC and with 
documents required by stock markets, stock exchanges and 
national competent authorities. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Quartile The fund which lies a quarter from the bottom (lower 
quartile point) or top (upper quartile point) of the table 
ranking the individual funds by performance measures. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Reporting - 
EVCA 
Reporting 
Guidelines 
Guidelines set by EVCA concerning reporting practices 
towards investors. Their aim is improve transparency, so that 
investors are better able to monitor and evaluate the 
performance of their investments and to make the asset class 
more accessible and comprehensible to new and existing 
investors. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Sequence The classification of funds by order of investment. First in a 
sequence is the new fund, defined as the first fund a 
management group raises together, regardless of the 
experience level of individual professionals in that group. 
Next are follow-on funds, defined as subsequent funds (II, 
III, IV, etc) raised by the same management group. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Stage The fund’s Stage refers to the stage of development of 
portfolio companies in which the funds make investments.  
 
Top Quarter Comprises funds with a performance measure equal to or 
above the upper quartile point. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Upper Quartile The point at which 25 percent of all returns in a group are 
greater and 75 percent are lower. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
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Valuation - 
International 
Valuation 
Guidelines 
Guidelines developed by EVCA, BVCA and AFIC (the 
European, British and French Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Associations) towards investors internationally 
concerning valuation methodologies. Their aim is improved 
transparency, so that investors are better able to monitor and 
evaluate the performance of their investments and to make 
the asset class more accessible and comprehensible to new 
and existing investors. The guidelines have been endorsed 
by more than 20 European and Non-European Associations 
and are consistent with IFRS and US GAAP. 
EVCA 
Glossary 
Vintage Year The year of fund formation and first drawdown of capital. EVCA 
Glossary 
 
